Imperialism: The Example of the Russian Federation

Article by the Revolutionary Communist Youth League of Russia (Bolsheviks) RKSM(b):

Introduction

The question of the role of the Russian Federation in the global imperialist system is important now more than ever. The ongoing war in Ukraine, the growing tensions between large capitalist powers and the ongoing crisis in the international communist movement bring the topic to the forefront of the discussion. Being only one aspect of a greater discussion on the nature of imperialism, it highlights how a flawed understanding of a given phenomenon can have far-reaching consequences for the political analysis of the global situation as a whole. This, in turn, can undermine the theoretical and practical work of entire organizations.

It is not the first time in the history of the communist movement that we see the potential disastrous consequences of such a mistake: the Second International’s collapse into infighting and support of one’s own bourgeoisie at the outbreak of the First Imperialist World War can be traced back to the similar root as the growing split in the international communist movement today, namely, the mischaracterization of imperialism.

In this context, having a clear understanding of the topic is of utmost importance, and we hope that this brochure will bring clarity to the question.

1. Definition of Imperialism

To describe a particular instance of a phenomenon (in this case Russian imperialism), it is first necessary to have an understanding of the phenomenon itself. The modern theory of imperialism was best exemplified in V. I. Lenin’s “Imperialism, The Highest Stage of Capitalism”, written in 1916 – in the midst of the First World War. Lenin conducts a thorough analysis of the developments of contemporary capitalism in Europe, the United States and the Russian Empire, in particular, the increasing concentration of production resulting in the emergence of monopolies as a logical outcome of competition, the merging of banking and industrial capital and the growing export of capital, rather than commodities, from more advanced capitalist countries to lesser ones. From this analysis, he concludes that the current stage of capitalist development, its highest and final one, is qualitatively different from the laissez-faire, free-competition capitalism that preceded it: where once competition reigned, now rule enormous monopolies that extend beyond the borders of a country; where state regulation was minimal and undesirable, now the newly-formed monopolies need it to protect their interests within and beyond national borders; where once banks were simply institutions for lending, borrowing and holding the money of wealthy industrialists, now transnational financial corporations with dozens of subsidiaries and daughter companies are giving and withholding credit to entire nations and holding control over the lives of hundreds of thousands of workers. So we see the dialectic in action – capitalism, through its quantitative growth and development, nurtured within itself the opposites of everything it once claimed to be. Key features of this new stage of capitalism were succinctly defined by Lenin:

“(1) the concentration of production and capital has developed to such a high stage that it has created monopolies which play a decisive role in economic life; (2) the merging of bank capital with industrial capital, and the creation, on the basis of this “finance capital,” of a financial oligarchy; (3) the export of capital as distinguished from the export of commodities acquires exceptional importance; (4) the formation of international monopolist capitalist associations which share the world among themselves and (5) the territorial division of the whole world among the biggest capitalist powers is completed. Imperialism is capitalism at that stage of development at which the dominance of monopolies and finance capital is established; in which the export of capital has acquired pronounced importance; in which the division of the world among the international trusts has begun, in which the division of all territories of the globe among the biggest capitalist powers has been completed”.

The first one – creation and domination of monopolies warrants extra attention because it is the most decisive feature from which others develop and the one that most contrastingly differs capitalist imperialism from the previous stage of capitalism. Lenin himself, stipulating the imprecision of short definitions, writes:

“If it were necessary to give the briefest possible definition of imperialism we should have to say that imperialism is the monopoly stage of capitalism. Such a definition would include what is most important, for, on the one hand, finance capital is the bank capital of a few very big monopolist banks, merged with the capital of the monopolist associations of industrialists; and, on the other hand, the division of the world is the transition from a colonial policy which has extended without hindrance to territories unseized by any capitalist power, to a colonial policy of monopolist possession of the territory of the world, which has been completely divided up”.

Therefore, monopolies will be at the centre of attention of our work, and it is prudent to clear the definition of the term monopoly. Monopoly is often colloquially understood as one specific enterprise that is the sole supplier of a particular product. However, that is not necessarily the case. As can be seen throughout Lenin’s work, even in the quote above, monopoly, as a defining feature of the highest capitalist stage, is the agreement between the largest enterprises in a particular sector. This was reflected in the first edition of the Great Soviet Encyclopaedia:

“CAPITALIST MONOPOLIES, capitalist associations that monopolise, by agreement between themselves, certain branches of production and circulation in order to displace and subjugate their competitors and obtain monopoly profits”.

And a monopolist enterprise then is a company or a bank capable of entering such an agreement (or controlling a particular sector on its own, of course).

An important part of the work is Lenin’s polemic against Karl Kautsky’s theory of “ultra-imperialism”. According to Kautsky, the internationalization of capital by the monopolies leads to the final division of the world and eternal peace. In contrast, Lenin demonstrates that the imperialist stage of capitalism entails an inevitable rivalry between imperialists for the redivision of territories and markets. This competition can take many forms, such as economic policies and diplomatic dealings, but its highest expression is war and forceful annexations. The inevitability of this outcome, as opposed to peaceful coexistence through further monopolization (and thus shared interest), derives from the increasing unevenness of capitalist development.

Several Marxist-Leninist parties have recently made contributions to the understanding of imperialism in contemporary circumstances. Emerging as a dynamic hierarchical system per se, the current structure of imperialism is more internally complicated than it used to be a century ago. As capitalist relations of production spread across the globe, more bourgeois states representing the interests of the local capitalists were established, formed in already present imperialist stage, on the terms of monopoly capital. This was particularly the case of former colonies that have now entered the imperialist system in a new form. The Great October Revolution, decolonisation (incentivised by the former) and bourgeois counter-revolutions have contributed to this. Therefore, ‘a handful of very rich countries’ that exploit the rest of the world was a historically specific form of the global imperialist system at the beginning of the 20th century. Following the Leninist understanding of the dynamics of imperialism, under different real-life circumstances the hierarchical structure of imperialism changes.

Unevenness of development under capitalism produces stronger or weaker imperialist states in economic, political and military terms. The strive of capital for self-expansion causes unresolvable contradictions between them. These intra-imperialist tensions occur not only between those at different levels of the hierarchical order but at each level too, as every capital aims to reach (or maintain) a top position in the system because it guarantees the aforementioned expansion for greater profits. Therefore, the division into levels, including the top one occupied by the leading powers, does not mean that other capitalist countries are their victims and does not imply a strict top-down hierarchy. On the contrary, it aims to highlight actors’ unequal mutual dependence, continuous development and the manifestation of strong contradictions that spread throughout the whole imperialist system and cause intra-imperialist confrontation.

It is also necessary to discuss some common contemporary misconceptions about what imperialism is. We often see how individuals and even entire organisations fall into opportunism, substituting the struggle for workers’ liberation and power worldwide with a single-minded fight against a particular group of imperialist states (be it the US, NATO, EU or Russia). In this worldview, imperialism is a set of policies and actions by individual states that subjugate all others, while capitalist countries are divided into “imperialist” and “victims of imperialism”. This approach ignores a highly globalised nature of the twentieth- and twenty-first-century capitalism and artificially separates the politics (superstructure) from the economy (basis); most worryingly, this leads to the support of capitalist regimes in their competition with other capitalists, which plays right into the hands of the oppressors. More and more we hear calls from bourgeois politicians for anti-imperialist struggle, imperialism in their eyes being “whatever the other capitalists do”. The Concept of the Foreign Policy adopted by the Russian government in 2023, which states the aim to ‘eliminate the vestiges of domination by the US and other unfriendly states in global affairs, create conditions to enable any state to renounce neo-colonial or hegemonic ambitions’ is just one example.

A dialectical view on global capitalist relations does not allow us to examine a single country (or more specifically, the capitalist class of said country) in isolation or solely as an aggressor/victim to another, but considers it as just one part of the global imperialist system. To reiterate, imperialism is not just a handful of rich countries exploiting the rest of the world (not that it is not necessarily the case) but is a global system of capital. Moreover, capital cannot be divided into ‘national’ and ‘international’. It is both national and international at the same time. It is one and the same capital, the dual character of which is reflected, for instance, in the activities of transnational corporations.

Now, that we have refreshed our memories on what exactly imperialism is and what it isn’t, let’s examine the Russian Federation as a capitalist state through the lens of this definition and see where it stands in the global imperialist system by analysing the specificities of Russian capital and its position and behaviour internationally.

2. Characteristics of Russian Capitalism

2.1 History and socialist economy

Unlike many of the world’s leading capitalist countries, post-Soviet Russian capitalism is marked by its emergence from a previously socialist economy. This emergence itself is addressed in the current subsection, while the consequences of capitalist monopolisation in the next. Here, we will touch upon the political economy of socialism and outline the reactionary steps that eventually led to the restoration of capitalism.

Capitalist counter-revolution finds its roots in the class struggle within the socialist society, the latter being in a state of movement from capitalism to full communism (whereas socialism is an immature, undeveloped communism). Even after the abolition of exploitative classes per se, the class struggle continues in the form of the struggle between commodity-capitalist and communist tendencies. Depending on the progress of the construction of communism, various capitalist vestiges, which have to be overcome, are present in socialism. One of those remnants is commodity production, the highest form of which is capitalism. The incorrect description of the relationship between commodity production and socialism and the resulting opportunistic theories, which treat socialism as its form, became a theoretical ground of the infamous Kosygin and Perestroika reforms.

Let us consider the Soviet socialist society of the early 1950s and the remnants of the capitalist formation that it contained. In it, there were two forms of socialist production: collective-farm, in which the state retained ownership of the machinery, and large-scale, fully workers’ state-owned industry. Collective farms (kolkhozy) resulted from the transformation of agriculture from peasant petty commodity into large-scale production, which is capable of accumulation and expanded reproduction to support the work of socialist construction. Uniting small peasant farms into large collective farms was also the simplest, easiest and most acceptable way of transition into the new system for the peasantry. Additionally, some individual auxiliary farms and handicraft production remained. A major part of social relations had the form of commodities. We say “form” as their nature differed, and commodity shell encompassed non-commodities too.

Objects (services, etc.) are commodities only because they are something two-fold, both objects of utility, and, at the same time, depositories of value. For commodity exchange to take place, their owners have to recognise each other as private proprietors10. Expanding on the subject of a commodity, Engels highlighted the following:

“Therefore when I say that a commodity has a particular value, I say (1) that it is a socially useful product; (2) that it has been produced by a private individual for private account, (3) that although a product of individual labour, it is nevertheless at the same time and as it were unconsciously and involuntarily, also a product of social labour and, be it noted, of a definite quantity of this labour, ascertained in a social way, through exchange; (4) I express this quantity not in labour itself, in so and so many labour-hours, but in another commodity”.

In the USSR of the early 1950s, commodity exchange takes place between the state and collective farms. Despite products being manufactured and transported under a centralised plan, they are nevertheless commodities as they are produced for exchange between two different [socialist] owners who recognise each other as such. It must be noted that the commodity production in question is different from the one in a capitalist society: there is no capitalist, no private ownership of the means of production, while labour is not a commodity.12 Earlier, in 1921, Lenin commented the following on the exchange of the goods between the socialist state and peasants:

“the manufactured goods made by socialist factories and exchanged for the foodstuffs produced by the peasants are not commodities in the politico-economic sense of the word; at any rate, they are not only commodities, they are no longer commodities, they are ceasing to be commodities”.

Commodities in form only (in essence non-commodities) are products of state production, distributed (“sold”) to workers and employees of state enterprises and institutions. A worker who gets an item from the state store does not purchase the former but receives his share of the collective product, as he already owns it, owning the means of production through his class organisation (i.e. the government of the proletarian dictatorship). Between state enterprises, commodity-value shell has the meaning of a form of accounting. Money used in operations with non-commodity products is also money only by form. All this may seem a bit confusing because the concepts and terminology developed for the analysis of capitalism are hardly applicable for the analysis of socialism.

To move forward with the construction of communism, economic separation of the producers – a condition for commodity production – had to be abolished, and the shell of old forms in the relations between people, in particular commodity fetishism, had to be discarded. Real socialisation of the means of production had to be increased; with it, the alienation of man from himself and products of his labour was to be overcome. For that, the development of the Marxist-Leninist theory was vital. However, as shown by the increasing development of commodity features and subsequent restoration of capitalism, the mainstream Soviet theory did not reach the necessary level.

Before narrating the changes in the Soviet economy from the mid-1950s, we would like to point out that nascent differences between the supporters and opponents of expanding commodity production in socialism are visible in the economic discussion of 1951, so the theoretical reasoning behind the reforms of the mid-1950s to mid-1960s did not appear out of nowhere but evolved out of some of the opinions voiced during the discussion. It is also noteworthy that the definition of the basic law of socialism as ‘the securing of the maximum satisfaction of the constantly rising material and cultural requirements of the whole of society through the continuous expansion and perfection of socialist production on the basis of higher techniques’. Thus, the set goal of socialist construction is reduced to the satisfaction of needs, substituting communist values of ‘full well-being and free, all-round development for all its members’ with bourgeois consumerism. Despite this and some other inaccuracies, we would like to emphasise the high significance of Stalin’s brochure “Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R.” for understanding the logic of the political economy of socialist society, as all of Stalin’s arguments are built from the position of the need to overcome commodity production, from the position of its fundamental incompatibility with the movement towards communist formation – the main message of the entire work.

As mentioned above, there were two forms of socialist production in the Soviet Union. Instead of eradicating the separation between them, the 1957 Sovnarkhoz reform, in contrast to the now deceased Stalin’s theoretical work regarding the measures for elevating collective-farm property to the level of public property, did the exact opposite: dispersed machine-tractor stations (MTS) and sold their agricultural machinery to collective farms. Olshtynsky notes: “liquidation of the MTS and sale of machinery to collective farms… worsened the efficiency of production due to the inability of collective farms to maintain, repair and renew it. The possibility of state management of the industry was reduced. The sphere of market commodity-money relations for tools and means of production expanded”. Even anticommunist researchers acknowledge reform perniciousness: for instance, Werth points out that the majority of collective farms were put into critical financial conditions, and in 1958-1961 – for the first time since the late 1920s – there was a reduction in the fleet of agricultural machinery.

In October 1961, XXII Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) was held, which adopted the new Party Programme. For the purposes of the current subsection, its following mistakes should be noted:

• declaration that dictatorship of the proletariat is no longer necessary in the USSR;
• on the whole, excessive reliance on fulfilling consumer needs as a prerequisite for communism construction;
• dedication to the use of commodity production and subsequent market economy categories:

“In communist construction it is necessary to fully utilise commodity-money relations in accordance with the new content inherent in them in the period of socialism. The application of such instruments of economic development as economic calculation, money, price, cost, profit, trade, credit, finance plays an important role in this process”;

• and, in addition to our previous paragraph: praise for the sale of agricultural machinery to collective farms.

The next milestone in the economic transformation was the 1965 reform (sometimes called the Kosygin reform).29 The reform, which was in line with the new party programme, changed enterprises’ performance assessment: the main criteria became profit and the value of sold products, instead of their gross volume. This significantly strengthened group element in common property and moved enterprises towards becoming independent actors with their own profit-oriented goals, “commodified” relations between them. Regarding the state, in which direction in our opinion, the reform took the Soviet economy, Osin rightly notes:

“If individual enterprises act as commodity producers (and otherwise it is difficult to understand why the category of “property of individual enterprises” is introduced), then there can be no question of any unified public property; group interest and group property will quickly come to the fore, displacing public property, which will exist only formally and legally. The strengthening of group property will inevitably strengthen private property interest and lead to the revival of private property relations and, ultimately, to the restoration of capitalism”.

In her article for the RKSM(b), Arkhangelskaya examines the industrial relations in the USSR in 1960-1980 in more details. Society and collectives of production units were pitted against each other by the introduction of fund charges, thus opposed – by form – as the owner of the means of production and the subject who uses them. To a much greater extent, the opposition between society and the collective was brought about by the already mentioned endeavour to make a profit in the individual enterprise instead of striving for the best performance of the economy as a whole. In particular, the isolation of enterprises manifested itself in:

• endeavour of an individual enterprise to obtain more profit, as it was used to form the funds for the development of this enterprise and material incentives;
• violation of planned discipline and consequential change in labour character to pursue the previous point;
• overpricing of products, which led to redistribution of results of labour of others;
• fictitious overestimation of production volumes;
• collectives that prioritised the public interest were at a disadvantage compared to the ones that did not.

The definitive qualitative changes took time to develop and the shift through group property to private property was exemplified to full extent during Perestroika. At this point, private property relations were in the shadow sector – stimulation of the shadow economy was another negative outcome. In her monograph, among other points, Lazareva concludes:

“… material incentives and formation of funds from the part of profit earned by the labour collective created a big problem for the planners – solvent demand not provided with commodity coverage. Strengthened by the social policy of the Soviet leadership, aimed at increasing the living standards of the population, it led to the rapid development of the shadow sector of the economy”.

By the late 1970s, the shadow economy accounted for 7-8% of the gross domestic product (GDP), according to Grossman. Its main part parasitised on the shortcomings of the formal sector, and it was not unusual for these shortcomings, e.g. commodity deficit or erroneous norms, to be created artificially to provide opportunities for the shadow sector. The following scenario is an example of the economy sector relations at that period: on-paper additions helped to fictitiously fulfil and exceed the plan, while the resulting surplus materials were written off and later sold on the black market. A favourable plan could have been obtained with the help of bribed state officials. That way, shadow relations and criminal elements penetrated the state apparatus.

In 1976-1985, economic development slowed down, as illustrated in table 1. Khanin also points to a sharp slowdown in the production investment growth. The growing economy inefficiency is also seen in the excess of fixed production assets to labour ratio growth over labour productivity growth (table 2).

By the mid-1980s, the problems in the economy were publicly acknowledged by the party leadership. In 1983, the new general secretary of the CPSU Andropov wrote in the “Kommunist”:

“One cannot help but see that the efforts we are making toward improving and reorganising the economic mechanism and the forms and methods of management and control fall short of the requirements imposed by the level of material, technical, social, and intellectual development attained by Soviet society. And this is important”.

In the same article, Andropov stated that the cornerstone of socialism is the social ownership of the means of production, addressed the issue of distribution under socialism and underscored that “the relations of distribution and an extremely strict control over the measure of labour and the measure of consumption must remain in the centre of attention of our party”. However, no action was taken to resolve the situation progressively. Instead, in 1984, enterprises of three union and two republican ministries were put on Khozraschiot, i.e. these enterprises were required to operate as self-financing market entities.

Perestroika developed the commodity-capitalist tendency with accompanying market reforms further. It was not the sole “solution” to the problems of the Soviet economy; a material basis for the construction of communism was present. For the latter, there was a lack of defined theory though. The pro-communist tendency economists of the time best formulated their position in a collection of articles published rather late – in 1990, when the counter-revolution was already in full swing. A more serious problem was the absence of the revolutionary subjective factor of sufficient force. Gorbachev and his companions were a product of the previous period, labelled by them as “era of stagnation”. They expressed the desire of upper nomenklatura strata to transform its managerial role into economic control over the means of production and – as the reforms continued – to become the bourgeoisie. So, under revolutionary slogans, counter-revolution gained momentum. Demagogy evolved accordingly – from an appeal to Lenin and assurances of commitment to socialism in the beginning to condemnation of Marxism-Leninism.

In August 1986, more than 20 ministries and departments of the USSR, as well as 70 largest associations and enterprises, were granted the right to directly carry out export-import operations (including the markets of capitalist and developing countries) from the beginning of the following year. Self-financing foreign trade firms were to be established in their structure. The same rights were to be granted later to other ministries, organisations and enterprises. In 1987, all state enterprises were transferredto financial self-support (Khozraschiot). As we have already written before, the strengthening of group property displaces public property and sooner or later leads to private property aspirations.

Self-employment was legalised in 1987, profit-driven cooperatives in 1988, which produced the first legal millionaire the following year. The first commercial bank – “Soyuz-Bank” – was established in 1988. Others quickly followed: by January 1st, 1990, 225 commercial and cooperative banks were registered, including 184 during 1989. In December 1990, the new law on the State Bank of the USSR (Gosbank) stated that, alongside the central banks of the republics, it was to contribute to the creation of general conditions for the functioning of commercial banks and the introduction of the principles of fair banking competition. Moreover, in accordance with this law, the central banks could not interfere with the operations of commercial banks. This law and the law ‘On Banks and Banking Activities’ finalised the two-tier system with a Central bank and commercial banks. By 1992, there were 1360 commercial banks in the former RSFSR – the newborn Russian Federation.

By August 1991, the country was in a deep financial crisis. The only salvation, as seen from the report of the first deputy prime minister of the USSR Shcherbakov, was the use of measures employed during the NEP shutdown and dekulakisation and resurrection of the wartime economy of 1941-1944 to return to a model of the planned economy of the late 1970s after 3-4 months. Following the course of previous implementation of market reforms, further development of the idea was stopped, for which Shcherbakov did not even write the reason in his note.

To summarise, the counter-revolution during Perestroika was not done overnight. Firstly, the role of profit and monetary stimulation was increased. Group element in the common property was strengthened. An attempt at “market socialism” was made and unsurprisingly failed. Finally, the course was taken onto full restoration of capitalism. The bourgeoisie forming in the republics (from the degraded upper nomenklatura strata that endeavoured to transform its managerial role into private ownership of production means) was interested in the creation of national states to protect its interests; the central governance collapsed and the Union was demolished. In each of the former Soviet socialist republics, the new national bourgeoisie took control of the industry built by the working masses of the Union. Commodity-capitalist tendency culminated in the highest form of commodity production – capitalism.

2.2 Monopolies in Russia

Another distinctive trait of the modern Russian capitalism is the process of formation of its highest phase, i.e. imperialism. Unlike the capitalist transformation at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries, when large industrial groups gradually emerged through competition, acquisition and growth of smaller enterprises, large concerns were already created as part of the centralised Soviet economy. During the privatisation that followed the dissolution of the USSR, they were handed over into private hands. Thus, the free-competition phase of capitalist development was practically skipped and almost immediately a highly monopolised economy was formed. Further concentration of capital during the 1990s went hand in hand with organised crime. Additionally, new oligarchs did not disdain from using state apparatus to pressurise their competitors. However, these competition peculiarities of the 1990s do not mean that the current highest stage of capitalism in Russia is qualitatively unique; the conclusion that the RKSM(b) has made back in 2007. In this regard, it is noteworthy that the market economy which was formed on the ruins of the USSR has entered the capitalist system at its imperialist stage, thus based on monopolies as the principal form of capital organisation.

Let’s take a look at some of the monopolies. Many of them do not confine themselves to one particular sector only but, to begin from somewhere, we will start our examination by industry.

Oil and gas. According to Rosstat (Federal State Statistics Service), in 2023, oil and gas industry accounted for 16.5% of national gross domestic product (GDP). The biggest companies are Rosneft, Surgutneftegez, Gazprom, Lukoil and Transneft. Natural gas production is dominated by 3 companies: Gazprom, Novatek and Rosneft, or even by one – Gazprom (fig.1).

Gazprom is a prime example of formation of a monopoly in Russia through privatisation of socialist centralised industry. Gazprom was established in 1989 by the degree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, which converted the Soviet ministry of gas industry into a corporation. In 1993, it was transformed into a joint stock company. Gazprom owns the national gas transmission network. In 2020, Gazprom accounted for 65% of natural gas produced in Russia. In 2021, it owned 15% of known global natural gas reserves and accounted for 12% of global natural gas production (fig.2).

Rosneft is Russia’s largest oil company declaring, as of 2024, extraction of over 40% and refining of over 35% of all Russian oil. In 2022, a total of 535 million tons of oil was extracted in Russia, which was distributed amongst the major companies as follows: Rosneft – 178.5 mln tons or 33%, Lukoil – 81 mln tons or 15%, Surgutneftegaz – 59.6 mln tons or 11%, Gazpromneft – 59.1 mln tons or 11%, Tatneft – 29 mln tons or 5.4%.

Transneft operates national oil pipelines. It transports more than 85% of oil produced in Russia and is the largest pipeline company in the world. Transneft owns more than 69 thousand kilometres of main pipelines and more than 500 pumping stations.

Oil and gas monopolies do not limit themselves to natural resources only; they have their own financial institutions and control scores of daughter companies in Russia and abroad. Inside the country, Rosneft and Gazprom operate through daughter companies that focus on one particular region of the country or a particular part of the industrial process. Gazprom is the largest stakeholder in Gazprombank, and Rosneft controls Russian Regional Development Bank. The next subsection expands on the unity of industrial and financial capital further.

Metallurgy. Nornickel is one of the world’s largest producers of green metals. In 2023, it accounted for 41% of palladium and 19% of class-1 nickel global output – more than any other company in the world. Moreover, it was the 4th largest producer of platinum with 11% of global production and 5th largest of rhodium with 8% of global production.

Another monopoly is non-ferrous metallurgy is Rusal. Apart from being the sole producer of high purity aluminium in Russia and all other Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries, it is the leader of aluminium industry globally. In 2023, the company accounted for about 5.5% of global production of aluminium and 3.8% of global production of alumina.

Black metallurgy is dominated by Severstal, Novolipetsk Steel (NLMK) and Magnitogorsk Iron and Steel Works (MMK). In February 2022, the Russian Federal Anti-monopoly Service found these three steelmakers to have violated antimonopoly legislation by setting and maintaining monopolistically high prices for hot-rolled flat steel products on the domestic market, of which their aggregate share was over 70%. Prices for hot-rolled steel rose faster than production costs.

Another notable player is Metalloinvest. In 2020, its share in national production was:

• 39% of iron ore concentrate and sintering ore production;
• 59% of iron ore pellet production;
• 100% of hot briquet iron (HBI) / direct reduced iron (DRI) and metallised pellet production.

Last but not least, Mechel and Evraz should be mentioned. In 2021, the latter controlled 48% of the North American and 74% of the Russian railway rail market, 69% of the Russian construction steel market, 23% of the Russian coking coal market, 14% of the global vanadium production volume.

All of the mentioned companies know how much natural resources they posses, and at least some of them – their global share, not only national. Natural resources supplies and market estimates are common nowadays and may not be given a second thought from the political economy perspective. Meanwhile, these are indicative of the concentration of production, of industry monopolisation and of socialisation of production. It is a feature of the highest stage of capitalism.

Military-industrial complex. The Kalashnikov Concern produces about 95% of all small arms in Russia and supplies to more than 27 countries around the world, making it the largest firearm manufacturer in Russia. Notably, 75% of the company’s shares are owned by just 3 private investors, while the remaining shares are in property of one of the biggest state corporations Rostec. This corporation functions in military and non-military sectors simultaneously. Apart from the arms concerns like the mentioned Kalashnikov, Rostec owns companies and holdings in civil industries, including drug development with company Nacimbio or machine industry with Uralvagonzavod transferred to Rostec in 2016 because of the company’s debts. Uralvagonzavod produces heavy machines for both civil and military purposes – from freight wagons to main battle tanks, being the sole tank supplier for the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and one of the largest tank manufacturers in the world.

Mechanical Engineering. Rostec also controls, among others, Russian Helicopters – the only Russian rotorcraft designer and manufacturer, and United Aircraft Corporation which consolidates all aircraft manufacturing companies. Continuing with “united”, United Shipbuilding Corporation, as of 2024, occupies about 80% of the Russian shipbuilding industry and almost completely (95%) covers the State Defence Order in it.

In agricultural machinery production, the leader is Rostselmash Group. As of October 2022, according to its co-owner, Rostselmash controlled 65% of the national market. (The figures vary depending on who does the estimation, which machinery is included and what year is under consideration, e.g. in 2023, Chinese manufactures increased their shipments).

In power equipment, the leader is Power Machines (Siloviye Mashiny). Incidentally, it has the same majority owner as Severstal does – a Russian billionaire Alexey Mordashov. Unfortunately for our analysis, the last annual report of Power Machines was published in 2017. On its website, the company boasts that more than 70% of Russian hydroelectric power plants are equipped with its turbines and generators and that every second Russian thermal power plant is equipped with Power Machines equipment. The company also producers turbines for nuclear power plants.

Talking about nuclear power plants, Rosatom is the only Russian company that constructs and operates them. On the world market, it holds the first place in terms of the number of simultaneously implemented nuclear reactor construction projects. Additionally, in Russia it generates nearly 20% of electricity, which is more than any other company, and owns the nuclear icebreaker fleet.

In transport, Russian Railways is the monopoly that manages railroad infrastructure and operates freight and passenger trains. Aeroflot Group, which includes airlines Aeroflot, Rossiya and Pobeda, carried 38.5% of air travellers in Russia in 2023.

Mobile communications market is fully divided between the “big four”: MTS, MegaFon, Beeline (a brand of VimpelCom which is a part of VEON Ltd, formerly VimpelCom Ltd) and Tele2. The Federal Antimonopoly Service from time to time issues notices to them.

In internet-related products and services, Yandex dominates the sector. Initially an IT company, it has spread its operation into many areas of daily life. The company’s website states that it is “a technology company that builds intelligent products and services powered by machine learning” and has “developed market-leading on-demand transportation services, navigation products, and other mobile applications for millions of consumers across the globe”.76 The company’s original product is the search engine of the same name. As of 2022, in Russia, 61% of all internet search traffic went through it. With the search engine comes email, maps, virtual assistance and other services. Yandex is also a significant player in the sectors of food delivery, car and scooter sharing, marketplace. The company remains a significant player in IT: to illustrate, it plans to educate more than 350 thousand IT specialists by 2026 (of which there are just 857 thousand in Russia in 2023).77 Additionally, Yandex owns a ride-hailing service Yandex.Taxi. In 2023, the Federal Antimonopoly Service officially recognised it as the dominant company. Particularly in Moscow, 83.5% of the taxi rides were ordered through this service in 2022.

Our examination does not encompass every monopoly in Russia, nor does it cover each and every detail of those. However, it is enough to illustrate the high extent of monopolisation of the Russian capitalist economy, despite its relatively young age. It is an important observation, because monopolies constitute the cornerstone of imperialism as a stage of capitalism. On the basis of monopolies other features of imperialism are based and develop: formation of finance capital, export of capital, transnational companies, colonialism and neo-colonialism, wars, etc.

2.3 Banks in Russia

“As banking develops and becomes concentrated in a small number of establishments, the banks grow from modest middlemen into powerful monopolies having at their command almost the whole of the money capital of all the capitalists and small businessmen and also the larger part of the means of production and sources of raw materials in any one country and in a number of countries. This transformation of numerous modest middlemen into a handful of monopolists is one of the fundamental processes in the growth of capitalism into capitalist imperialism; for this reason we must first of all examine the concentration of banking”.

Lenin, “Imperialism, the highest stage of capitalism”

The role of banks in the modern capitalist economy has reached such a level that bourgeois governmental institutions recognise the biggest banks as systemically important. Russia is not an exception. Table 3 lists those credit institutions that the Bank of Russia (Central Bank of the Russian Federation) considers systemically important, as per its press-release from October 2023. The listed banks account for nearly 78% of the Russian banking sector’s total assets.

However, the banking sector is even more monopolised than the cited press-release states. To start with the list above, VTB has purchased Bank Otkritie in late 2022. Furthermore, the detailed statistics published by the Bank of Russia offer more insight.

As shown in table 4, as of June 2024, five largest banks possessed 65.3% of the sector’s assets. Together with the next five – 78.8%. Considering that VTB and Otkritie are counted separately, it can be stated that the first percentage is higher and nine, not ten, account for 78.8%. Meanwhile, at the same time there were 320 banks in Russia. The biggest is Sber which in 2023 set a historical record of ₽1.5trn net profit. Whereas the whole banking sector’s net profit was ₽3.3trn that year (so Sber accounts for around 45%), also a record after ₽0.2trn in 2022. Incidentally, for 2024 Central Bank forecasts another record – ₽3.6 trillion. These details demonstrate the level of concentration of the banking sector.

Regarding the question of relations between banks and industry, we shall now touch upon the corporate loans. As of 4th quarter of 2023, the composition of the Russian banking sector loan portfolio is ₽34 trillion to individuals and ₽74 trillion to legal entities, so the latter account for 68.5% of the loan portfolio. The amount of loans given to legal entities has been steadily growing over the years. Thus, according to the Central Bank’s data, the total amount of loans granted to all legal entities in roubles by 30 largest Russian banks amounted to ₽35 trillion at the beginning of 2019. By the end of 2009, this amount reached about ₽2.6 trillion. In ten years, the amount increased more than 13 times and, considering the sector’s monopolisation, more than doubled between 2019 and 2024, far above the inflation rates.

Discussion of the role of banks in the national economy at the highest stage of capitalism is inseparable from analysis of unity of industrial and banking capital in finance capital, which is duly done in the next subsection.

2.4 Finance capital in Russia: industry and banks united

Defining finance capital, Lenin emphasises the following:

“The concentration of production; the monopolies arising therefrom; the merging or coalescence of the banks with industry—such is the history of the rise of finance capital and such is the content of that concept”.

Born out of coalescence of banking and industrial monopolises, finance capital dominates the national economy to the extent that it becomes essential for functioning of the latter.

In two previous subsections, we reviewed the industrial monopolies and banks in Russia separately. Let us now turn to the financial-industrial groups (FIG) that stem from them.

Firstly, we should clarify the process of formation of contemporary Russian finance capital. As was already mentioned, monopolies arose from the privatisation of communal industry, not from the growth, acquisition and merger of smaller enterprises. Another aspect is that after the counter-revolution Russia entered the already formed world imperialist system on bourgeois terms, i.e. as a bourgeois actor. Newly formed national capital had to compete with foreign finance capital. The new Russian bourgeoisie inherited a diverse industry but was more interested in sectors of the economy that were profitable in the new conditions. Thus, some industries went under, while others had powerful monopolies been established. Overall, the Russian financial-industrial groups may be conventionally categorised into “industrial”, such as Gazprom or Basic Element (belongs to Deripaska: En+ Group, Russian Machines, etc.), and “banking”, for instance Sberbank or VTB, depending on the starting sector of their expansion.

In our review of monopolies in subsection 2.2, we started with the oil and gas industry. A key company there is Gazprom. However, it extends its operations far beyond these sectors. As the reader may have noticed, Gazprombank is one of the systemically important banks in the Russian Federation (see table 3). According to Interfax rankings, as of 2nd quarter of 2024, it is the third bank in Russia by key performance indicators after Sberbank and VTB. Gazprom owns pension fund Gazfond and one of the leading insurance company in the country named Sogaz. As of 2022, its strongest positions are in the segments of accident insurance with about 48% of the market, voluntary medical insurance – about 36%, and property insurance of legal entities – about 50%. Gazprom-Media owns several TV and radio channels and various online entertainment platforms, including Rutube. In 2021, Gazprombank itself has acquired the assets of Russia’s largest social network VK.88 Similarly, Rosneft and Sugrutneftegaz are highly engaged into the sectors beyond their direct specialisation through the control over the Russian Regional Development Bank and Surgutneftegazbank respectively.

Among the groups that have commercial banks as a core and then spread their capital into various spheres, Alfa Group, VTB and Sber can be pointed out as the major players. For instance, during the COVID-19 pandemic, Sber created a company to ‘organise the production and distribution of vaccines’ and simultaneously bought 45% of the online pharmaceutical marketplace ‘Eapteka’, intending to introduce the sale of drugs in instalments. SberEntertainment manages Sber’s assets in entertainment and advertising: Rambler Media Group, which includes Rambler media portal and major online newspapers Lenta.ru and Gazeta.ru; online cinema Okko; animation studio Soyuzmultfilm and others. In addition to providing corporate loans and IT solutions to developers, Sber operates in the construction sector through Smart Konstrakshn and SB Development. Sber’s subsidiaries invest into various industries, whether it is an investment into production of Chinese car brands or ownership of a pharmaceutical plant and a floating fish factory. Even e-groceries are not left aside: Sber’s daughter companies Kuper (previously branded as Sbermarket) and Samokat were first and second by turnover in 2023. As for VTB, the bank owns VTB Development that operates in constructions. In 2023, VTB received the United Shipbuilding Corporation into trust management for five years.

Another example of a financial-industrial group is AFK Sistema. As of 2024, it is the main shareholder (42%) in MTS – one of leading provider of mobile and fixed telephony services in Russia and the CIS, as mentioned in section 2.2. MTS, in turn, controls MTS Bank. AFK Sistema also controls, with over 70% of the shares, Segezha Group – one of the largest vertically integrated timber holding companies in Russia. AFK Sistema holds a major stake in Ozon, an e-commerce company that was named third most expensive Runet company by Forbes in 2024, after Yandex and Wildberries, another marketplace with which Ozon monopolises the market. It is also the main shareholder of Etalon, one of the leading developers in Russia. Other assets, which we are not listing fully here, include Cosmos Hotel Group.

These are only a few examples of finance capital, most notable and more traceable to the general public. Groups that control dozens of companies do not publish easily accessible up-to-date lists of their assets. Economic sanctions further incentivise billionaires to hide details on their ownership. For example, in 2022, after being added to an EU sanction list, Melnichenko ceased to be the main official beneficiary of fertilizer producer EuroChem.

Nevertheless, given examples illustrate the existence and the extent of finance capital in the Russian Federation. Earlier in this chapter, we also reviewed the dominance of industrial and banking monopolies. Next, we shall trace the expansion of finance capital to various regions – from the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries to the African continent and beyond.

3. Russian Capital Abroad

Having reviewed the formation of monopolies and finance capital in Russia and their role inside the country, let us consider the export of capital, internationalisation of these monopolies and their participation in the imperialist division of the world.

To reiterate the first chapter of this work, one of the characteristics that differentiates imperialism from the previous stage of capitalism is a particular importance of export of capital over export of commodities. Export of capital, or capital expansion, is driven by pursuit of surplus value. At the highest stage of capitalism, accumulation and concentration of capital reaches such a level that the necessity for capital export arises from the lack of profitable space for application of all capital in the ‘home’ country. (This does not mean that there is literally no space ‘at home’; the question lays at the rate of profit. If capital can be employed at a higher rate of profit in a foreign country in comparison with the ‘home’ country, the attractiveness of the former increases. As Marx points out, ‘such capital is absolute excess capital for the employed labouring population and for the home country in general’).100 Another noteworthy trait is that capital expansion extensively reproduces specifically finance capital, not just capitalist relations in general. In other words, when exporting capital, monopolies do not establish free-competition environment but rather expand themselves often using the state apparatus to get preferential conditions.

In our analysis, we have to resort to the bourgeois statistics, in which, of course, the Marxist category of capital export does not exist. The export of capital can take the forms of direct investment (FDI) and portfolio investment (PFI). Since FDI are more directly connected to ownership of the means of production, and hence to the ownership of surplus value, than PFI, it is of greater interest to us.

Before we proceed, it must be noted that the informative value of FDI with respect to real capital exports is limited. For instance, the so-called “round-tripping” of capital from the country of origin to off-shore entities and conduit countries and then back does not represent the real export of capital. Foreign investments from the country of interest can also be made through off-shore entities and conduit countries, which complicates the analysis. Despite these difficulties, we shall identify the major destinations of the expansion of Russian capital as well as the most significant sectors and particular players in this movement of capital.

3.1 Former Soviet Republics

As mentioned in the previous chapter, the economic legacy that the Russian capitalists took in their hands has shaped their interest in the production sectors and markets in the CIS countries as primary targets for the expansion of Russian finance capital. The Soviet Union developed advanced industries, including oil and gas, electric power, chemical, construction, metallurgical, space industry and many others and established a united economic space built on the production chains across the republics. This determined the greater interest of Russian capital. Besides, the post-Soviet bourgeois republics are also markets, on which, among other commodities, the local labour force is sold, and a significant portion of it is cheaper than of Russian workers.

The Russian bourgeoisie still accounts for the absolute majority of FDI in the CIS countries. As stated in the 2023 report of the Eurasian Development Bank (EDB), Russia has maintained the position of the main FDI exporter in what the reports defines as the Eurasian region: Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Ukraine. Since 2016, the minimum share of Russian FDI in the region was 78.9%. Russian financial-industrial groups play a central role in the capital expansion. In 2023, Russian investors were involved in 12 of the 20 new projects, with a total value of $1.1 billion. More than 81% ($22.8 billion) of total mutual investments in the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) is represented by investment projects carried out by Russian companies in the other countries of the Union.103 In 2022, the combined share of Lukoil and Gazprom in total mutual FDI stock in the CIS is more than 40%. A large role was played by banks with subsidiary networks. At the end of 2016, which we take here as a point before withdrawals in 2022 due to sanctions, the list of top investors in the banking sector was headed by Sberbank ($882 million), followed by VTB ($388 million), VEB ($383 million), Alfa-Bank ($362 million) and Gazprombank ($234 million).

Let’s take a closer look at capital export by country of destination. At the moment of our analysis, i.e. in 2024, the biggest recipient of Russian capital is Kazakhstan. In the 1990s, after the establishment of its capitalist state, foreign capital swiftly entered the country. The Kazakh bourgeoisie made multi-billion deals not only with Russian TNCs but others too, such as Chevron and ExxonMobil.105 As for the Russian FDI stock, by the first half of 2023, it reached $13 billion concentrating in oil and natural gas extraction, metal ores mining and chemicals manufacturing. Only four companies – Lukoil, Rosatom, Eurochem and Transneft – invested more than $5 billion, which shows the state of monopolisation in the area. Rosatom, for example holds a 50% share in Akbastau and Karatau uranium plants and, in 2023, has purchased Budenovskoe uranium plant for $1.6 billion, which put Rosatom into 2nd place in the world by uranium reserves.

Speaking of Central Asia, Russia is the largest investor in Uzbekistan. As of the end of the first half of 2023, 26 out of 27 mutual projects with EAEU countries are direct investments coming from Russian companies, the largest made by Lukoil with an FDI stock of about $8 billion. In 2023, the Ministry of Energy of Uzbekistan stated that profit distribution agreement is 50/50 between Lukoil and the state. According to the state budget execution report for the first half of 2023 published by the Ministry of Economy and Finance of Uzbekistan, Lukoil paid $103.1 million to the state fulfilling the agreement.

Belarus, hosting a developed industrial and agricultural complex since the Soviet times, is the second-largest recipient of Russian capital in the EAEU with $5.6 billion of direct investments made in 2023. FDI are primarily allocated into the financial sector, along with petroleum and gas refining. Five Russian banks – Sberbank, VTB, Gazprombank, Alfa-Bank, and Vnesheconombank (VEB) – have branches in Belarus with their aggregate FDI reaching $1.6 billion. By comparison, their total investments in Kazakhstan prior to withdrawal in 2022 amounted to $1.2 bln. Belgazprombank, owned by Gazprom directly and via Gazprombank, is recognized by the National Bank of the Republic of Belarus as systemically important. In 2023, its net profit was 119.6 mln Belarusian roubles (BYN). Alpha-bank and VTB recorded net profits of 320 and 96.5 (+47% compared to 2022) mln BYN correspondingly. The whole Belarusian banking sector profit in 2023 was 2.94 bln BYN.108 The gas transmission system of the Republic of Belarus is operated by Gazprom Transgaz Belarus, fully owned by Gazprom. This includes over 7,900 km of gas pipelines, over 2,900 km of which ensure transit of Russian natural gas to European countries. Net profit of Gazprom Transgaz Belarus was 430 mln BYN in 2022 and 299.8 mln BYN in 2023.109 Russian bourgeoisie’s involvement in the Belarusian economy leads to their involvement in country’s politics, for instance, in the 2020 presidential elections and the following civil protests.

South Caucasus also presents interest to Russian capital. Up until 2023, when it was overtaken by the UAE, Russia was the largest foreign investor in Armenia. In 2023, Russian investments there amounted to $3.2 billion. In 2019, there were more than 40 large enterprises in Armenia with full or partial participation of Russian capital in the leading sectors of the country’s economy. Annually amongst the top 10 largest taxpayers, as well as the largest employers of the Republic were:

• Gazprom-Armenia CJSC;
• GeoProMining Gold LLC: in 2016 Sberbank controlled nearly a third of the shares;
• Electric Networks of Armenia CJSC: from 2006 to 2015 a subsidiary of “RAO UES INTERNATIONAL” CJSC; in 2015 100% of the shares were purchased by Tashir Group and in 2017 it transferred 30% to a Cyprus offshore.

In Georgia, over 2021-2023, total Russian FDI stock remained at $1.1 billion and consisted mostly of projects completed earlier. As of 2023, the largest investment project is the acquisition by Alfa-Group Holding of a 55.8% stake in IDS Borjomi International, with an FDI stock of $647 million.

Azerbaijan is of higher interest. As of 2023, Russian investments in Azerbaijan amounted to $4.2 billion. Some of the largest projects included Lukoil’s investments in the Shah Deniz gas condensate field ($2.9 billion), South Caucasus Pipeline Company ($300 million), and LUKOIL-Azerbaijan petrol station network ($115 million).

South Caucasus, or Baku–Tbilisi–Erzurum, gas pipeline and Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, that runs parallel to it, go from Azerbaijan through Armenia and Turkey to Europe. Economic interests around these routes heavily dictate players’ actions in the region. In particular, just 40 km away from the aforementioned pipelines is Nagorno-Karabakh, which existed as a quasi-state and was disputed between Armenia and Azerbaijan all the years since the dissolution of the USSR. In September 2023, Azerbaijan’s forces took full control of the region securing their gas export route, while the Russian government, previously supportive of Armenia and Nagorny Karabach in this regard, had barely engaged, indicating the shift in economic (see also amount of FDI in those countries) and political interest in cooperation with the Azerbaijani rather than the Armenian ruling class. In August 2024, after Putin’s visit to Baku, Azerbaijan submitted an application to BRICS which was officially welcomed by China.

Ukraine is of high interest to the Russian bourgeoisie. Apart from the mentioned reasons for the former Soviet republics in general (production means, labour force, market), the country is an important geographical location, having access to the European market, onto which Russian companies have oriented themselves since the 1990s, and the Black Sea ports. Before the events of 2014, Ukraine was the main centre for the expansion of Russian capital. As the data on FDI in 2012 shows, Ukraine was the main importer of capital in the CIS region, accounting for 18.7 billion dollars, or around 30% of the total amount of mutual FDI, and no other country has imported this much from Russia ever since. Russian companies made multi-billion deals expanding influence in the variety of Ukrainian industry: for instance, MTS and VimpelCom invested a total of 6 billion dollars in telecommunications; Evraz, VEB and VS Energy – 3.8 billion in metal production; TNK-PB (acquired by Rosneft in 2013) – 650 million dollars into oil refining; while VTB, VEB, Alfa-Bank introduced a total of 1.5 billion dollars to the Ukrainian financial sector. However, its competitors by class had plans of their own, and after the 2014 coup, the new government put pressure on the Russian TNCs, forcing them to sell their assets and mask ownership. For instance, in 2015, LUKOIL sold its network of 240 petrol stations and 6 oil depots to AMIC Energy, in 2016 Transneft sold Prikarpat-Zapadtrans (petroleum products pipelines), in 2017 Severstal sold Dniprometyz, the same year Odessa oil refinery, owned by VTB, was nationalised. Overall, it was evident that the total loss of assets was only a matter of time, hence the capitalistic competition took military form, which will be discussed in chapter 4. The case of inter-imperialist competition over Ukraine also illustrates the change in forms of capitalist competition that came with the highest stage of capitalism.

“The specific forms of competition (the shift of the centre of gravity from the method of cheap prices to the method of strong pressure, ultimately wars) are explained, firstly, by the monopolistic structure of modern capitalism; secondly, by the fact that the struggle for raw materials and for places for the export of capital (where the method of cheap prices has nothing to do with it) has increased in importance, and moreover, on condition of monopolistic possession of these spheres; thirdly, by the fact that the problem of marketing itself is not the same as before: The struggle is not between homogeneous enterprises with their specific, classical form of competition, but between gigantic ‘state-capitalist trusts’ encased in the armour of state power”.

Overall, the Russian TNCs have been increasing their export of capital into the former Soviet republics (except maybe the Baltic states which joined the EU) ever since the dissolution of the USSR. With time, Russian finance capital accumulated and concentrated even more, and its interests outside Russia grew. The so-called ‘special military operation’ shows how far Russian capital is willing to go to defend its interests.

3.2 Europe and the US

Alongside the export of goods, the expansion of Russian capital to the European and American markets has also been significant, especially in the 2000s. For example, in 2004, Severstal bought Rouge Industries, which was the 5th largest metallurgical company in the United States at that time.118 Lukoil acquired Getty Petroleum Marketing, which owned around 1300 gas stations in the US in 2000, bought a network of 376 gas stations in Europe from ConocoPhillips in 2006 and purchased the controlling stock (79.5%) in Serbian Beopetrol in 2003.119 United Heavy Machinery, which is, as of 2024, owned by Gazprom through Gazprombank, purchased some of Škoda assets in 2004.120 Banks followed suit, e.g. Sberbank started with purchasing 100% of Volksbank International (VBI) in 2011.

After 2014, when the contradictions between the major groups of the Russian and Western bourgeoisie started to intensify with a new stage in the imperialist fight over Ukraine, the EU imposed economic sanctions against Russia and economic relations started to decline. However, in large, they still blossomed up until 24 February 2022. In 2021, Russia was the EU’s fifth largest trade partner (5.8% of the EU’s total trade in goods with the world); the Russian FDI in the EU amounted to €162.4 billion, while the EU’s in Russia – to €256 billion.

Despite the loud claims of all parties about the ‘breaking of business connections’ with each other, the ties between Russian and European capital have been preserved even after the outbreak of the war in 2022. For example, the assets of Gazprom have been nationalised in Germany, while the Italian oil refinery which belonged to Lukoil’s subsidiary was sold this spring to a Cyprus-based private company that, according to its CEO, does not ‘have any connection whatsoever with Russia’. On the other hand, another Russian monopoly Rosneft invested more than 5 billion dollars into its German assets, despite the nationalisation of some of these, and also paid record dividends, given the record 9-month profits last year, to its shareholders – including BP, which still owns 20% of the company. Rusal still operates its Kubikenborg Aluminium (Kubal) smelter in Sweden. United Heavy Machinery invested into the reconstruction of its Pilsen Steel in Czechia.

Trade, in particular the export of natural resources, still goes on. The most infamous example is the continued gas transit from Russia to the EU via Ukraine. Comparing to 2021, the EU increased imports of nuclear fuel from Russia and services for the bloc’s Russian-designed reactors in 2023. Rosatom also remains the top foreign nuclear fuel supplier for the American reactors.

While it is business as usual in some areas, Russian finance capital is pushed out by its counterparts in other areas, where the latter are stronger: redivision ‘in proportion to capital’, ‘in proportion to strength’ – the only method under commodity production and capitalism.

For instance, Sber was forced to completely exit the European market in 2023, abandoning its extensive subsidiary network. The European gas market was redivided. The share of Gazprom pipeline gas in EU imports dropped from over 40% in 2021 to about 8% in 2023. For pipeline gas and liquid natural gas (LNG) combined, Russian companies accounted for less than 15% of total EU gas imports. On the other hand, in 2023, the US monopolies were the largest LNG suppliers to the EU, representing almost 50% of total LNG imports. In 2023, compared to 2021, imports from the US almost tripled.

These few cases show only a bit of deeply intertwined imperialist relations, in which Russian capital still plays a significant role, not as an ‘innocent (semi-)colonial economy of the semi-periphery’, but as a predator – just as hungry for profits as any other national capital in the era of imperialism. The predators’ current size does not matter, and the correlation of forces can change swiftly as uneven economic and political development is an absolute law of capitalism.133

3.3 Middle East

Alongside rapidly increasing trade with India, Iran or Turkey to evade the sanctions imposed by the Western capitalists, Russian capital in its non-commodity forms is actively expanding to these countries too. In the case of Iran, a vital actor in the emerging China-led imperialist bloc, the Russian bourgeoisie makes billion-worth deals on development of oil and gas industry. In July 2022, Gazprom and the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) signed the largest investment agreement in the history of Iranian oil industry.134 Under this agreement, Gazprom is taking part in the development of two natural gas fields, six oil fields and the construction of export pipelines.135 In May 2022, a formal deal, in which the state-owned monopoly Russian Railways is a crucial actor, on the multi-modal North-South corridor from Russia to India through Iran was signed.136 Russian capital expands in the Iranian banking sector. In 2023, the aforementioned Russian bank VTB came to Iran with pretensions to become an ‘agent between the two countries’ as Iranian and Russian banks have announced the integration of their banking system.137

Moreover, Russian capital has extended its influence on the Iranian nuclear and military sectors. Back in 1992, Russia and Iran signed a treaty establishing their cooperation on “civil nuclear power”. Throughout the years, the Russian specialists helped to build the first nuclear reactor of Iran in the joint-cooperation program, which was finished in 2011.138 Since 2019, a 10-year construction of the second and third nuclear power units has begun. Moreover, to secure the safety of Iranian reactors and get closer to the emerging imperialist power in the strategical region in military terms, the Russian state supplied several S-300 missile systems which were allocated in the vicinity of the reactors.139 When the invasion of Ukraine began in 2022, Iran was the first one to assist Russia militarily through the sale of Shahed Unmanned Aerial Vehicles.140 Finally, as comes from the news about the Russian business missions to Iran that became frequent since February 2022, Russian capital is to expand into other various sectors in Iran, including agriculture, logistics, construction, IT and pharmacology.141

Syria presents another pivotal target for Russian capital in the discussed region. Particularly, its energy resources, financial reserves alongside markets for Russian arms and foodstuffs are just several factors that defined the presence of Russian capital since the 2000s and its military involvement since 2015.142 For two decades, the Russian bourgeoisie has been actively engaged into a number of oil-related projects, such as the construction of new oil refineries and pipelines and modernisation of the existing ones all over the country – from Baniyas to Deir ez-Zor.143 After the civil war in Syria has already begun, a 25-year contract on oil and gas exploration along the Syrian Mediterranean coast was signed between the Russian company SoyuzNefteGaz and the Syrian state under the presidency Bashar al-Assad, whom the Russian state has been supporting militarily.144 War-torn Syria has been long a market for the Russian arms representing a ‘weapons testing facility’ even in the words of the biggest news agency closely affiliated with the bourgeois state.145

Russian capital does not bypass another long-standing hotspot in the region to the North from Syria. Given the historically tight connections of Israel with the US in economic, political and military terms, Russian capital has been actively targeting another side of the conflict – Palestine and some particular Palestinian organisations.146 For instance, in 2006, Hamas was officially recognized as a representative of Palestinian autonomy.147 Further diplomatic contacts with this organization allowed the Russian state to be a mediator between Israel and Palestine for quite a while and ensured a presumably more favourable position in the Arabic world. The mediatory activity continued after another escalation of the conflict happened in October 2023.148 This political role is strategically important for Russian capital, whose interests in this confrontation may not be seen at a glance.

Apart from weakening of the rival American, Israeli and European monopolies established in the region, the Russian imperialist bourgeoisie is interested in this part of the Middle East from a logistical point of view. Since the direct route from Russia to the Central and Western European states has been more limited due to the sanctions imposed by the EU, the Russian bourgeoisie is generally re-orienting more towards Asia and Africa, which makes the maritime route through the Red Sea an important spot for the Russian ruling class. In its turn, this way requires the support of some Arab states and non-state actors, such as the Palestinian Hamas or Yemeni Houthis. Notably, they have guaranteed the safety of Russian and Chinese ships passing through the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea while attacking specifically the transports of the US and the UK for their massive military, financial and political support to the Israeli state in the escalation in Gaza.149 This context helps us position the Russian bourgeoisie in another frontline of the global inter-imperialist struggle – in such a hotspot where its role is not that straightforward.

Finally, one must not forget about the long-established connections of Russian capital with Turkey. From 2004 onwards, Russia has been supplying natural gas through the Blue Stream trans-Black Sea pipeline and the TurkStream pipeline, which was officially launched in 2020.150 In the sphere of nuclear power, Russian capital has expanded to Turkey too. Back in 2010, Russian and Turkish states signed an intergovernmental agreement on cooperation in the construction and operation of the Akkuyu nuclear power plant in Turkey (Mersin province) – the nuclear fuel has been officially delivered there in 2023.151 Moreover, an interesting tendency has occurred regarding Russian legal entities after the war in Ukraine started. In 2023, over 1300 firms were registered by Russian citizens in Turkey, while the Russian FDI to Turkey exceeded $30 billion.152 It shows that many Russian businesses found Turkey as a more preferable and controllable off-shore zone rather than, for example, Cyprus which was a notable off-shore destination for years. Since Turkey has become a hub towards the European markets for Russian capitalists, it is easier to establish shell companies there to evade sanctions.153

While the interests of Turkish and Russian capital coincide in some areas, they contradict in others which is reflected in the attempts of the Turkish capitalists to balance between the two imperialist blocs. Turkey is a member of NATO, it supplies Bayraktar military drones to Ukraine and their manufacturer Baykar is building a plant near Kiev.154 Although the Russian companies have found a haven in Turkey, the Turkish authorities restrict some of the operations to avoid the sanctions from the European and American sides. For instance, Turkey used to be one of the countries that allowed the usage of the Russian payment system ‘Myr’ after the beginning of the ‘special military operation’, but once the threat of secondary sanctions has increased in September 2022, this payment system has stopped to operate.155 Speaking of the Middle East, the Russian-Turkish interests vividly clash in Syria. Turkey to this day conducts military operations against the Kurds, gaining ground and control over oil pumps – the captured areas have several huge oil fields.156 Thus, the so-called ‘anti-terrorist operation’ was in fact started to secure more profit, deprive the Kurds of their income and carve up Syria in competition with other imperialists, including Russia, which, as described earlier, also has ambitions in the Syrian energy sector.

3.4 Africa and Latin America

Russian capital expands in Africa under the slogans of multipolarity and the eradication of colonialism. The summit ‘Russia-Africa’, held in July 2023, illustrates the public positioning of relations as equal cooperation, in contrast to the colonial policies.157

The most visible corporation operating in Africa is Rosatom due to the character of the nuclear industry. Rosatom constructs El-Dabaa nuclear power plant (NPP) in Egypt. In Ghana, in 2023, Rosatom took part in the information collection procedure for construction of a NPP there. Uranium One, a subsidiary of Rosatom, is implementing mining projects in Mali, Namibia and Tanzania.158

Russian capital executes a military expansion to advance its interests. As of 2024, Russia has agreements on military-technical cooperation with 30 African states. At the end of 2023, the Ministry of Defence started to form the African Corps. Earlier that year, it helped to create the Sahel Military Alliance – an alliance of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger announced in October 2023 with the plans for its expansion through the inclusion of other African states, such as Algeria. From October to mid-November, the Malian military in alliance with the Russian specialists carried out an operation against Tuaregs taking control over the key population centres, including Kidal, where the government army had not entered since the 2012 uprising.159

Let us briefly touch on Latin America in this subsection too. An important country of interest is Cuba, in dealings with which the Russian bourgeoisie parasitises the close socialist Soviet-Cuban ties and exploits the vulnerable position of the blockaded Island of Freedom that does not have many options in its foreign economic relations. In 2016, Rosneft signed a contract with the Cuban largest oil company CUPET and has been extracting Cuban shelf oil since then.160 From the same year onwards, Inter RAO has been reconstructing and building power plants in Cuba. This company and its subcontractors received tax exemptions, and the works are financed from the loan given by the Russian government – the usual scenario in the era of monopolies.161 In 2019, Russian Railways signed a 10-year contract with the National Railway Company of Cuba to modernise the Cuban railways using the Russian technologies, materials and equipment.162 The state-level integration facilitates the export of capital. Since 2020, Cuba has been an observer state of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), and the parties have declared deepening integration and cooperation, including favourable conditions for EAEU companies in the Mariel special economic zone.163

As state cooperation in the interest of businesses is carried out at the highest level, the case of Russian capital’s activities in Cuba is an illustrative example of the mergence of the state and monopolies in international relations. Alongside executing the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie inside the country, the state lobbies the interests of its class abroad and provides favourable conditions for the monopolies in order to guarantee both the export of capital and the following export of commodities.

These are only some cases of the expansion of Russian capital, which is progressing even more intensively with the escalating contradictions of the imperialists worldwide.

3.5 China

Given the tendencies in the global imperialist system with China being a significant capitalist power in the emerging bloc of imperialists and the definitive ‘re-orientation’ of Russian capital towards it after February 2022, China should be discussed in more detail. Since 2014, Chinese and Russian capital have been rapidly increasing their mutual commodities and investment exchange. In 2015, the Chinese and Russian states signed an agreement that brought together the development of the Belt and Road Initiative and the EAEU, which, as discussed before, is the area dominated by Russian capital.164 In the same year, for instance, the Russian FIG Gazprom and the Chinese corporation CNPC have agreed on the construction of a pipeline ‘Power of Siberia’ through which the Russian capitalists deliver gas to China that is highly dependent on all kinds of fuel – from oil to coal and gas. The volumes of gas supplies have especially rocketed in 2022 and are likely to increase further since two more parts of this pipeline were opened in December 2022.165 The Russian suppliers provide the Chinese with significant discounts – up to 50% in 2024 compared to the prices for gas transported to Turkey and Europe and up to 30% later on.166 Chinese capital is spreading in Russian agriculture with the growing grain supplies and plans on construction of port terminals and production plants by, for example, a Chinese-dominated Legendagro or other firms under the project ‘Grain Terminal Nizhneleninskoye-Tongjiang’, as well as manufacturing and construction sectors.167

Considering all this data, the expansion of Russian capital to China may be considered insignificant and irrelevant. However, this would be a mistake as the Russian FIGs like Rosatom, Sber or Alfa-Group have been intensifying their presence in the Chinese economy too. For example, in 2023, the commercial bank of Alfa-Group announced the opening of two full-service branches in Beijing and Shanghai, while Sber, another Russian FIG, is about to open its branch by the end of this year.168 For some years now, the state-owned monopoly Rosatom has been constructing several nuclear power plants in China.169 Moreover, in March 2023, this monopoly has signed a ‘comprehensive long-term cooperation program’ with a Chinese governmental agency under which the expansion of Russian capital, including in the form of new nuclear plants, is going further.170

In 2023, China has strengthened its status as Russia’s main foreign trade partner. Chinese-Russian trade has expanded even further in 2023, increasing by 27% compared to 2022 and reaching a record high of $240 billion.171 Russia’s importance in China’s trade turnover has also grown, but it is still not so great – only about 4%, – while the shares of the EU and the US have reached 13% and 11% respectively.172 Russia mainly imports machinery, transport vehicles and equipment that together account for 61% of total import from China, and, in turn, the latter exports mainly Russian fuel of different kind (from oil to coal) which constitutes 70% of import from Russia.173

Even these few examples clearly show the sectors in which the Russian and Chinese capitalists are respectively interested the most. For Chinese capital, it is the fuel industry which is still crucial for the Chinese production sectors, despite the current downturn, construction, given the real estate crisis in the internal market, and the agricultural sector that has become profitable, since the war in Ukraine became a good excuse for the bourgeoisie to inflate the prices of grain. Russian capital, in turn, follows the same pattern of capital expansion as in the previously discussed parts of the world targeting especially the sectors of nuclear power and banking.

4. War in Ukraine

Since February 22, 2022 and up to the publication of the current work, one of the defining aspects of the global economical and political life has been the outbreak of a large-scale war in Ukraine. Since the first day, the RKSM(b) has consistently characterised the war as imperialist, underscoring the global inter-imperialist rivalry.174

Just as the Ukrainian industry, natural resources and agriculture were an integral part of the larger Soviet economy, capitalist Ukraine remained a close trading partner of Russia and a target for intense capital investment. However, this newly-opened market did not remain uncontested – Western capital also saw the value in the rich Ukrainian soil, its factories, mines and people. Additionally, control over the Ukrainian economy provides economic and, consequently, political leverage on the Russian capital and its closest trading partners. The struggle for control over Ukraine for over two decades took the forms of economic, political and cultural competition.

In subsection 3.1, we looked into Russian monopolies’ investments into the Ukrainian economy prior to 2014 and their forced exodus, providing some background for the armed conflict. In this chapter, we will have a deeper look into the war in Ukraine as a result of the competition between imperialist blocs, starting with the 2014 conflict in Donbass as the premise of the war, continuing with the expansion of Russian capital into the territories it acquired, along with Ukrainian, Western and Chinese capitals benefits.

4.1 People’s republics of Donbass

The imperialist competition over Ukraine took a sharp turn to violence with the 2014 political crisis, regime change in Kiev in favour of the pro-western powers and the outbreak of a civil war between the central Ukrainian government and the People’s Republics of Donetsk and Luhansk that followed. Donbass was already economically oriented towards Russia – Donetsk and Luhansk regions were amongst the leading ones (after Kiev and Dnepropetrovsk) in the amount of imported Russian capital – more than $2.5 billion in only one year of 2012.175 The events of 2014 stimulated the will of its population to integrate with Russia politically too.

Despite the pro-active presence of popular grassroots movements in the republics that took the forms of militias, sometimes labour resistance and civic self-organisation, the character of this movement was mainly spontaneous and ideologically patchy. This created the grounds for Russian capital and its state to take advantage of the situation: to make Donbass a buffer zone, use the local population as a bargaining chip in the negotiations with new political representatives of the Ukrainian bourgeoisie, freeze up the military conflict and afterwards destroy even the seeds of the popular movement. As a result, in less than a year – after the Minsk agreements, assassinations of field commanders like Alexey Mozgovoy, questionable elections in the Republics since the participation of some forces, including the communists, was constrained by the Russian side, – the People’s Republics have fallen under complete control of the Russian bourgeois state, which became hugely beneficial for the Russian ruling class to push their influence into the region further. In 2017, the republics had nationalised the Ukrainian-owned enterprises, which would be privatised by the Russian bourgeoisie later.176

4.2 Russian capital in the “new regions”

In 2022, Donbass and two other oblasts of Zaporozhye and Kherson had de-facto and officially, from the point of view of the Russian state, become part of the Russian Federation, meaning that Russian capital received full control over the territories with developed industry, $12.4 trillion worth of energy deposits, metals and minerals.177 But not only natural wealth is of interest, as finance capital in general strives to seize the largest possible amount of land of all kinds in all places, taking into account its “potential” to capitalise multiple times its value.178 Even rebuilding of destroyed cities promises profit.

Because of the war, many local enterprises are either closed or damaged. Amongst these are the Zaporozhye nuclear power plant, machine-building factories in Melitopol and Kakhovka.179 Some of those are completely destroyed, and their fate remains unknown, like the chemical and electrical plants in Severodonetsk and Lysychansk – two of the cities that suffered the most from the battles.180

There is a continuing effort from the state to rebuild and open them. The Russian government has already invested more than half a billion dollars into the region and established the ‘free economic zone’, which reduces taxes and makes trading with another part of the country easier.181 This led to the opening of many previously abandoned enterprises, such as coal mines and machinery facilities like Luhansk aircraft repair plant, which, when was fully operational, made millions of dollars as profit in 2013-2014. In 2023, out of 500 in total, around 160 enterprises were launched.182

Still, a majority of these plants and factories, which are damaged, heavily worn out and generally not profitable, remain nationalised and, consequently, maintained at the state expense, i.e. using the taxes paid by the working class. Later, once the enterprises go through restoration and return to work at full capacity, the government starts actively searching for new owners, tries lending and plans for privatization.183 This illustrates a common trend in the capitalist formation: privatisation of profits and nationalisation of losses.

In 2021, seven large metallurgical and chemical factories in Donetsk and Luhansk were handed over to a Russian billionaire Evgeniy Yurchenko, often called the ‘owner of Donbass’, and his company UGMK, which gave him almost $100 million of profit in 2023.184 Yurchenko hopes for the further privatisation of the industry after the end of the ’special military operation’. Another couple of metallurgical factories and machinery production enterprises, which still operate with millions of dollars in turnover but without profit in 2023, belong to local entrepreneurs Igor Andreev and Vladimir Trubchanin.185 In Mariupol, a businessman close to Kadyrov privatised the metallurgical plant, which made over $60 million in 2021.

The factory resumed its work in late 2023.186 At the same time, the ‘Azovstal’ metallurgical factory is not to be restored due to the damage it received.187

Both regions of Kherson and Zaporozhye remain the youngest in terms of integration into Russia and at the moment of the publication are not fully under the control of the Russian army, including its capitals and the surrounding areas, which contribute heavily to the local industry. After Russia retreated its military forces from Kherson in late 2022, most of the controlled enterprises were agricultural ones. 70% of them have been already re-registered under the Russian legislation and began the export of the harvest already in 2022.188 For example, there are multiple working agricultural facilities which are private local companies that made a total of $10 million of profit in 2023.189 There are also a couple of state-owned enterprises, such as a partly operational seaport in Berdyansk or ‘Tavriya-Energo’ in Melitopol, which made $20 million in 2023.190 But even in Ukraine-controlled territories, some industrial plants remain connected to Russian capital, such as large metallurgical factories in Zaporozhye owned by ‘Metinvest’, half of which belongs to Russian ‘Vnesheconombank’ since 2010.

The exports from the ‘new regions’ continue to be mainly directed towards Russia, as they provide much-needed coal, metals, chemicals and machinery for the industry in other regions, as well as grain.191 Donbass has the potential to be a large energy consumer of gas and oil.192 The majority of Russian companies have not yet entered the new markets due to the danger of being near the frontline while the war is continuing, but large Russian banks are already in talks about breaking the ice.193 Overall, Russian capital is the main beneficiary of new territorial gains and has great plans ahead for further expansion.

4.3 Benefits of the Ukrainian bourgeoisie

One should not forget about the benefits that the Ukrainian ruling class gets in such a situation – from the excuses to attack the workers’ rights and impose the bourgeoisie’s interests on the population under the persistent ‘national threat’ to increased profits thanks to the active participation of the ‘Western partners’ and the deals related to Russian capital. The war has not only stopped but to an extent even increased the profits that the Ukrainian bourgeoisie has been gaining from common business with the Russian capitalists, since it has become yet another suitable ground, for instance, for the fees for transportation of Russian oil through pipeline on the Ukrainian territory to rise.

Despite the bold claims of the state officials about ‘de-oligarchisation’ and the ongoing destruction of the Ukrainian infrastructure, many leading Ukrainian capitalists have remained unchangeably represented in a variety of sectors receiving high profits. In this regard, Rinat Akhmetov is a prominent example. In energy industry, Akhmetov is the biggest private owner. Four of his companies made it to the top-10 biggest companies by revenue in 2023.194 Similarly, Akhmetov’s interests spread on the mining industry. The SCM Group owned by Akmetov is represented in this sector with six companies, which had their net profits increased in 2023 constituting almost a half of top-10 revenues in the sector that year.195 Additionally, there were reports of Akhmetov’s DTEK together with Mykola Zlochevsky’s Burisma and Ihor Kolomoisky’s Ukrnefteburenie entering into a cartel agreement, which allowed them to sell 1.5 billion cubic meters of natural gas to the Ukrainian state at 50% higher price.196

As for the processing industry, two biggest companies – Zaporizhstal and Camet Steel (owned by Akhmetov) – have suffered losses of income due to their assets either being destroyed or falling under control of the Russian state.197 Nonetheless, a third of the leading income-earners in this sector belong to Akhmetov’s group, thus enriching the latter by billions of hryvnias. The confectionery company Roshen owned by the family of a former Ukrainian president Poroshenko gained the largest profit of over 5.5 billion hryvnias among the top-10. Similarly, the financial sector in the country is seeing an increase in profits, boosted by an influx of foreign aid, high interest rates on government bonds, pay rises for soldiers, and central bank policies.198 In 2023, the profits surpassed pre-war levels, reaching 83.2 billion hryvnias ($2 billion), while in 2021 they were 77.5 billion hryvnias.

The role of agrarian sector in Ukrainian economy has been historically significant, and it continues to bring great profits after the outbreak of the war. The export of grain has increased: in 2020/2021, almost 45 million tons were exported from Ukraine, while in 2022/2023, approximately 49 million tons.199 This resulted in $12 billions of profits for private companies in 2023. For example, Andriy Verevsky’s ‘Kernel’ controls most of the country’s agricultural land. In 2021, during the record harvest, its profit totalled $513 million, 4.4 times more than the year before.200 In 2022, the profit was $321 million, which is less than in 2021 but still 2.75 times more than in 2020. In 2023, despite the war, the profits increased by a third (compared to 2022) – to $437 million. It is noteworthy that 31% of grain that this company exports goes to China. Despite the risks, Kernel continues to invest to ensure its profits. In 2023, it invested $44 million in two Odessa ports, which have already been shelled several times and destroyed grain reserves.201 In addition, as a result of an auction held that same year, Verevsky has increased his stake in the company from 41.3% to 74.05%.202

Finally, the war has not stopped the common business of Ukrainian and Russian capitalists. For the former, the war has become a suitable ground to increase the fees for transportation of Russian oil through pipeline on the Ukrainian territory. As for the latter, for instance, Gazprom continues to supply gas for transit through the territory of Ukraine via the Sudzha gas metering station, which was captured by the Ukrainian army together with parts of Kursk region in July 2024, in the maximum volume confirmed by the Ukrainian side.203 In this case, payments to the Ukrainian state are treated as respectable business relations, whereas individual Russian citizens are criminally persecuted for treason for far inferior sums.

4.4 The interests of Western capital

The Western capitalists saw large profits increase since the beginning of the war. This, naturally, includes the military-industrial complex, but also oil and gas sectors. By putting thousands of sanctions on Russia and its companies in Europe and the US, closing borders, blocking trading routes or just simply seizing the assets, Western capital has driven out its Russian counterpart from the markets both inside and outside of Ukraine, thus allowing its own bourgeoisie to take over.

While Russian capital spreads its nets in the ‘new regions’, the Ukrainian bourgeoisie keeps the privatisation of the land to local and foreign, mainly European, actors at higher prices, and European and American trading companies get profits from the export of products grown on this land.204 The sale of Ukrainian land has only intensified in the recent years. In 2023, 58.5% of land purchase transactions took place at prices only 2% higher than the minimum possible. It resulted in 380.5 thousand hectares being sold, which is about one percent of the entire area of Ukraine. Since January 2024, the Ukrainian government has initiated another stage of land reform that opens the land market, which was previously available for purchase by individuals (like farmers) only, to larger corporate entities.205 Thus, Ukrainian and foreign landowners and agrarian holdings are given a legal tool to expand and bankrupt the petty bourgeoisie buying off their property – the ongoing military conflict especially favours such a turn of events.

In addition to this, the Western states also provide financial “assistance” to Ukraine, a large part of which comes as a loan. Therefore, Ukraine, namely the Ukrainian population, has to repay at least €20 billion to the international investors until the end of 2024 and €18 billion to the EU starting in 2033.206 International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimates from November 2023 indicate the country’s external funding gap will amount to at least $85.2 billion for 2024-2027, while the debt repayments will add up to over $30 billion.207 Heavy foreign investments into energy, infrastructure, manufacturing and IT sectors also take place.208

The war in Ukraine has revitalized NATO. Both the American and European militaries are receiving heavy investments. NATO expects 23 of its members to meet or exceed the target of investing at least 2% of GDP in defence, compared to only three members in 2014.209 At least six European countries increased their defence spending by over 10% in 2023 alone with some of those – by up to 30%.210 The majority of these investments goes directly to the private arms manufacturers, whose profits skyrocketed in the last years. For example, in Germany, which has the highest military spending of all EU states, an arms manufacturer Rheinmetall saw profits jump by 27% and shares rise by 55% in one year. Another arms producer, a Сzech company CSG, which arms Ukraine with refurbished Soviet tanks and other combat vehicles, reported a 130% revenue growth and a 49% profit increase in 2023 and made its owner a billionaire.211

As for the US, according to the data released by the US Department of State, in 2023, the US foreign military sales increased by 16% reaching a record-breaking $238 billion. Of them, sales arranged through the US government amounted to $80.9 billion, which was a 56% increase in comparison with 2022.212 Looking at the spending of US Department of Defence for 2022, $389.5 billion were spent on contracts for products, three biggest recipients of which – Lockheed Martin, Raytheon Technologies and General Dynamics – received $91.4 billion or almost a quarter.213 The latter two reported an increased profit compared to 2021.214 Finally, as already mentioned in section 3.2, the US used the war to rapidly increase its share of the European energy market, making it one of the biggest gas suppliers to the EU.

4.5 Chinese capital involvement

On the other side, Chinese capital is trying to satisfy their interests too – even if it is not that explicit. The Ukrainian territory is an important element in the route of Chinese capital to Europe through the Belt-and-Road Initiative (BRI), which is also evident to Western capitalists. Considering the broader inter-imperialist contradictions, the presence of the Chinese capitalists in Ukraine has been historically rather weak. The Chinese monopolies have not established themselves, since specifically American bourgeoisie has not been ready to give up this crucial and tasty spot. It has often intervened in the relations between the Chinese and Ukrainian capitalists and encouraged the latter to take a pro-Western position. As an example, in 2021, the Ukrainian government halted an acquisition of an aircraft engine producer ‘Motor Sich’ by a Chinese aerospace company Skyrizon due to the US concerns over the technological development of its imperialist rival.215

Despite this, since 2017, the Ukrainian bourgeoisie participates in the BRI facilitating the entry of Chinese capital into the Ukrainian market.216 An important Ukrainian sector of agriculture– important for both Ukrainian exports (and the economy generally) as well as Chinese imports – has witnessed a more active participation of Chinese capital. For example, in 2016, a Chinese state-owned agricultural corporation COFCO launched the terminal in the Mykolaiv port which later became one of the ports involved in the so-called ‘grain deal’ in 2022-2023.217 In 2013, Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps bought 9% of Ukraine’s farmland, equal to 5% of the country’s total territory, with a 50-year lease.218 In 2021, China Longyuan Power Group Corporation, the country’s largest wind power producer, built and put into operation a large wind farm in the city of Yuzhne.219 Despite the official rhetoric of ‘support of poor countries’, the major buyers under this ‘grain deal’ were several European countries and China.220 That is why specifically China has been insisting on the restart of this deal, when the Russian side quitted it in July 2023, but only up until the autumn of that year when the news about the signed deals directly with the Russian grain suppliers surfaced.221

The previous subsection has also pointed to the close links between Russian and Chinese capital that have intensified with the war in Ukraine bringing more indirect benefits to the Chinese corporations linked with the technological, industrial supply and capital inflow to the Russian economy (and military). To illustrate, after February 2022, the Chinese companies have massively replaced their Western counterparts in the Russian sectors of machine tools, electrical equipment and automobiles, in which the Chinese companies account for over a half of the market.222

4.6 Global inter-imperialist competition

Putting the war in Ukraine into the global context of inter-imperialist competition, one can conclude that Ukraine has been an important market into which Chinese monopoly capital has also attempted to enter. However, it never established itself that deeply and widely, as, for example, European-American capital has done, taking some position in only a few sectors, like agriculture. Ukraine has become an arena for imperialist struggle – and not only between the Ukrainian and Russian bourgeoisie, Russian and European-American capitalists, but in some cases directly between American and Chinese capital. With the greater orientation of the Russian bourgeoisie on Chinese capital and intensifying competition between the strongest monopoly capital of the US and China specifically, the latter seems to bet on gaining benefits from the Ukrainian markets indirectly – through the hands of the Russian bourgeois class which enjoys economic, technological and international political support from the Chinese side.

Moreover, the current conflict helps the Chinese capitalists to distract their main rival from the East Asian region and specifically Taiwan, since the American business and state concentrate lots of their resources on Ukraine and Israel. That is the case at least for now – but the bourgeois alliances are largely unstable because they are built on the contradictions between specific imperialists, the contradictions of the capitalist system per se which eventually lead to nothing but war. The declarations of ‘denazification’, the liberation of an oppressed people and fight for a ‘multipolar world’, mixed with fierce nationalism and chauvinism, hide the banal desire of the Russian ruling class to expand its control over territories and markets. The calls from the other side of the frontline to defend ‘the motherland’ or, perhaps more comically, freedom and Western values, are also just a thin veil over the demand to fight for the right to be exploited by the Ukrainian oligarchs and Western transnational corporations.

For successful anti-imperialist struggle to happen, it is vital to see past this thin veil and constantly bring attention to the content of the contemporary economic struggle – the redivision of the world – putting this content above the various forms it takes, such as protective tariffs, economic sanctions, arms shipments, direct military intervention, etc.

5. The Place of Russian Capital in the Imperialist System

In the Leninist sense, imperialism is a stage of capitalism, and all the characteristics that Lenin pointed out belong to the stage in general, not to the bourgeoisie in the borders of a particular country only. What this analysis helps us do is not simply to illustrate Russian capital as a concrete case of the general objective law, but, moreover, to identify the specific position of Russian capital in the imperialist system.

We see that the economy of Russia is heavily monopolised and concentrated in the hands of few corporations. Banks and industry are united through the systems of shared ownership, vertical integration and broad finance-industrial groups. Such a high degree of monopolisation and finance-industrial mergence was an integral feature of the newborn capitalist country. Finance capital holds enormous power and spreads its influence far beyond the country’s borders, actively expanding itself into other countries, founding daughter companies abroad and participating in international organisations, like BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), by means of which the bourgeoisie of different countries pursues common ambitions and solves their internal class contradictions in a more ‘peaceful’ manner.223 But, as we have seen many times in history, these ‘peaceful’ bourgeois deals and negotiations are either easily replaced by the military means or go alongside them straightaway.

Meanwhile, it is important to highlight that the fact of the relative weakness of the Russian bourgeoisie, the fact of the Russian economy’s dependency on foreign capital, especially American and European whose place has been now taken by the Chinese monopolies, must not lead us to the conclusion that the Russian ruling class and its state are less dangerous to the international proletariat. Instead, we can see how Russian monopoly capital uses the political heritage of the USSR, builds up and actively utilises military force to guarantee its existing dominance in the neighbouring territories and potentially its further expansion for greater profits, striving to be on par with the aforementioned imperialist behemoths. The current war in Ukraine is a clear illustration of this.

All these discussed notions help us locate the Russian bourgeoisie in the global imperialist system as a regional imperialist that tries to fight (with the working peoples’ hands) for its greater profits and influence in the same predatory manner as any other imperialist, despite its comparatively weaker economic force. To state otherwise would be either a sign of poor analysis or intentional dishonesty – sadly, plenty of both can be seen in the statements and actions of various communist organisations, both within Russia and worldwide.

Conclusion

In the first chapter of this article, we gave an overview of what modern imperialism is. After tracing the historical development of capitalism within the Soviet Union, we showed the genesis of capitalism in the Russian Federation. Analysing the concentration of production and capital, the merger of banking and industrial capital, the export of capital by the monopolies and consequential actions of the state, up to and including participation in the territorial division of the world, we have demonstrated that, despite the misconceptions of some organisations and deliberate rhetoric of the bourgeois propaganda, Russian capital is one of the crucial imperialist actors in the global capitalist system at its highest stage.

We have identified the place of Russian capital in this system: the Russian Federation is actively involved into imperialist competition in the international arena, which includes the struggle for political and economic domination over less developed nations and better conditions for its own capital internationally, with direct military action being one of the tools in this competition.

The latter includes, first and foremost, the war in Ukraine, which is only one facet of a larger confrontation: the struggle for dominance between the imperialist blocs. This redivision of the global market is an inevitable consequence of the imperialist stage of the global capitalist system, and as the contradictions between imperialist blocs continue to grow, the flames of war will engulf larger and larger swaths of earth and burn the pretence of bourgeois respectability.

“Violated, dishonored, wading in blood, dripping filth – there stands bourgeois society. This is it [in reality]. Not all spic and span and moral, with pretence to culture, philosophy, ethics, order, peace, and the rule of law – but the ravening beast, the witches’ sabbath of anarchy, a plague to culture and humanity. Thus it reveals itself in its true, its naked form”.224

Any ‘peace’ in the era of imperialism is based on the strengths of the blocs of finance capital, and, as the they change, ‘peace’ is only an armistice before another world war. The current prospect of it looks grim to say the least, however the dialectics is that the

“Imperialist war is the eve of socialist revolution. And this not only because the horrors of the war give rise to proletarian revolt—no revolt can bring about socialism unless the economic conditions for socialism are ripe — but because state-monopoly capitalism is a complete material preparation for socialism, the threshold of socialism, a rung on the ladder of history between which and the rung called socialism there are no intermediate rungs”.225

In addition to the material base, execution of the socialist revolution requires direct action by the proletariat led by its vanguard – the communist party. In order to succeed, the international proletariat needs a guiding theory for its class struggle, i.e. Marxism-Leninism. Regarding imperialism and the struggle against it, it must be said that mischaracterisation of imperialism, lack of the Leninist understanding of it, leads to the support of one of the imperialist blocs. Therefore, it is of utmost importance to have clarity on the question of what imperialism is, and this work is our modest contribution on the subject.

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• Khanin, G., 2008. Economic history of Russia in modern time. Monograph in 2 vol. Vol.1 Soviet economy from the end 1930s to 1987. Novosibirsk: Novosibirsk State Technical University. Available at: https://istmat.org/node/56774 (in Russian)
• Khanin, G., 2010. Economic history of Russia in modern time. Monograph in 2 vol. Vol.2 Economics of USSR and RSFSR in 1988–1991. Novosibirsk: Novosibirsk State Technical University. Available at: https://istmat.org/node/56774 (in Russian)
• Kosolapov, R., 1979. Социализм: к вопросам теории [Socialism: Questions of Theory] 2nd rev. ed. Moscow: Mysl (in Russian)
• Lazareva, L., 2021. Экономическая реформа 1965 года: предпосылки, ход, итоги [The 1965 economic reform: premises, course, results]. Monograph. Moscow: Moscow Region State University. (in Russian)
• Lenin, V., 1902. Draft Programme of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party. Available at: https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1902/draft/02feb07.htm
• Lenin V., 1915. The Collapse of the Second International. Available at: https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1915/csi/
• Lenin, V., 1915. On the Slogan for a United States of Europe. Available at: https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1915/aug/23.htm
• Lenin, 1915. Preface to N. Bukharin’s Pamphlet, Imperialism and the World Economy. Available at: https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1915/dec/00.htm
• Lenin, V., 1917. Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism. Available at: https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1916/imp-hsc/
• Lenin, V., 1917. The Impending Catastrophe and How to Combat It. Available at: https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1917/ichtci/index.htm
• Lenin, V., 1921. Instructions of the Council of Labour and Defence To Local Soviet Bodies. Available at: https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1921/may/21.htm
• Lenin, V., 1923. On Cooperation. Available at: https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1923/jan/06.htm
• Luxemburg, R., 1915. The Junius Pamphlet: The Crisis of German Social Democracy. Available at: https://www.marxists.org/archive/luxemburg/1915/junius/
• Marx, K., 1867. Capital. Vol.1. Available at: https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1867-c1/
• Marx, K., 1894. Capital. Vol.3. Available at: https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1894-c3/
• Osin, R., 2022. М.В. Попов и «Рабочая Партия России»: марксизм или ревизионизм? [M.V. Popov and the Workers’ Party of Russia: Marxism or Revisionism?]. Available at: https://rotfront.org/m-v-popov-i-rabochaya-partiya-rossii-ma/ (in Russian)
• Osin, R., 2022. The Economic Discussion of 1951: the Main Approaches to the Development of Problematic Theoretical Questions of the Political Economy of Socialism. Problems in Political Economy, 2(30), pp. 80-99. Available at: https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.6881315 (in Russian)
• Osin, R., 2023. The evolution of the political economy of Socialism. The role of Stalin’s doctrine of commodity production under Socialism. Svobodnaya Mysl, 6(1702), pp. 53-72. (in Russian)
• Papariga, A., 2013. On Imperialism – The Imperialist Pyramid. Available at: https://inter.kke.gr/en/articles/On-Imperialism-The-Imperialist-Pyramid/
• Semikashev, V., Gayvoronskaya, M., 2022. Analysis of the State and Development Prospects of the Russian Gas Industry before and after 2022. Scientific Works: Institute of Economic Forecasting of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 2022, pp. 108-127. Available at: https://ecfor.ru/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/rossijskaya-gazovaya-otrasl-posle-2022.pdf (in Russian)
• Shcherbakov, V., 1991. Note on urgent measures to normalize finances and monetary circulation in the country. Available at: http://gaidar-arc.ru/file/bulletin-1/DEFAULT/org.stretto.plugins.bulletin.core.Article/file/2612 (in Russian)
• Spanidis, T., 2022. On the political economy of contemporary imperialism. Available at: https://kommunistischepartei.de/diskussion/on-the-political-economy-of-contemporary-imperialism/
• Stalin, J., 1929. The Right Deviation in the C.P.S.U.(B.). Speech Delivered at the Plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission of the C.P.S.U.(B.) in April 1929. Available at: https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1929/04/22.htm
• Stalin, J., 1929. Concerning Questions of Agrarian Policy in the U.S.S.R. Speech Delivered at a Conference of Marxist Students of Agrarian Questions. Available at: https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1929/12/27.htm
• Stalin, J., 1952. Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R. Available at: https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1951/economic-problems/
• Vagenas, E., 2020. On the international political-military framework of the modern world. Communist review, 6/2020. Available at: https://inter.kke.gr/en/articles/ON-THE-INTERNATIONAL-POLITICAL-MILITARY-FRAMEWORK-OF-THE-MODERN-WORLD

1. Lenin, V., 1917a. Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism. Ch. 7. Available at: https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1916/imp-hsc/ ↩︎
2. Ibid. ↩︎
3. Great Soviet Encyclopaedia Text / ed. by O. Yu. Schmidt Monada-Naga Vol. 40, 1938. Available at: https://rusneb.ru/catalog/000199_000009_008005528/ (in Russian) ↩︎
4. See e.g. Papariga, A., 2013. On Imperialism-The Imperialist Pyramid. Available at: https://inter.kke.gr/en/articles/On-Imperialism-The-Imperialist-Pyramid/; TKP, 2018. Theses on imperialism on the axis of Russia and China, 2017. Available at: https://www.tkp.org.tr/uluslararasi/theses-imperialism-axis-russia-and-china-2017/ ↩︎
5. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 2023. The Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation. [online] Available at: https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/fundamental_documents/1860586/ ↩︎
6. Stalin, J., 1952. Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R., sect. ‘Commodity production under socialism’. Available at: https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1951/economic-problems/index.htm ↩︎
7. Stalin, J., 1929. Concerning Questions of Agrarian Policy in the U.S.S.R. Available at: https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1929/12/27.htm ↩︎
8. Lenin, V., 1923. On Cooperation. Available at: https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1923/jan/06.htm ↩︎
9. Marx, K., 1867. Capital, vol. 1, ch. 1, sect. 3. Available at: https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1867-c1/ ↩︎
10. Ibid., ch. 2. ↩︎
11. Engels, F., 1878. Anti-Dühring. Herr Eugen Dühring’s Revolution in Science, part III, ch.4. Available at: https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1877/anti-duhring/ ↩︎
12. Stalin, 1952. sect. ‘Commodity production under socialism’. ↩︎
13. Lenin, V.I., 1921. Instructions of the Council of Labour and Defence To Local Soviet Bodies. Available at: https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1921/may/21.htm ↩︎
14. Kosolapov, R., 1979. Socialism: Questions of Theory. 2nd rev. ed. Moscow: Mysl. pp. 249-251 (in Russian);Osin, R., 2023. The evolution of the political economy of Socialism. The role of Stalin’s doctrine of commodity production under Socialism. Svobodnaya Mysl, 6(1702), pp. 53-72 (in Russian). ↩︎
15. Kosolapov, 1979, pp. 232-233. ↩︎
16. Ibid., pp.253-255. ↩︎
17. Stalin, 1952, sect. ‘Commodity production under socialism’. ↩︎
18. Stalin also writes about it in his “Economic problems of socialism in the USSR”. ↩︎
19. Osin, R., 2022a. The Economic Discussion of 1951: the Main Approaches to the Development of Problematic Theoretical Questions of the Political Economy of Socialism. Problems in Political Economy, 2(30), pp. 80-99. Available at: https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.6881315 (in Russian). ↩︎
20. Stalin, 1952, sect. ‘The basic economic laws of modern capitalism and socialism’. ↩︎
21. Lenin, V., 1902. Draft Programme of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party. Available at: https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1902/draft/02feb07.htm ↩︎
22. Stalin, 1952, sect. Reply to comrades A.V. Sanina and V.G. Venzher;See the 1958 Law on Further Development of the Collective-farm System and Reorganization of the Machine and Tractor Stations. Available at: https://docs.historyrussia.org/ru/nodes/246092-zakon-o-dalneyshem-razvitii-kolhoznogo-stroya-i-reorganizatsii-mashinno-traktornyh-stantsiy-prinyat-pervoy-sessiey-verhovnogo-soveta-sssr-pyatogo-sozyva-31-marta-1958-g (in Russian) ↩︎
23. Olshtynsky, L. ed., 2016. Soviet society: History of socialist construction in Russia, vol. 3: Soviet society development in the conditions of the technological revolution and confrontation of two world systems. Moscow: ITRK. (in Russian) Cited in Osin, 2023. ↩︎
24. Werth, N., 1998. History of the Soviet Union, 1900-1991. Cited in Osin, 2023. ↩︎
25. CPSU, 1961. XXII Congress of the CPSU. Verbatim report. Moscow, 17-31 October 1961. Part 3, sect. Programme of the CPSU. Available at: https://istmat.org/files/uploads/52747/22_sezd._chast_3._1962_g.pdf (In Russian). ↩︎
26. Ibid., p. 303. ↩︎
27. Ibid., p. 294. ↩︎
28. Ibid., pp. 284-285. ↩︎
29. The measures were implemented gradually. Initial decrees are published for example in ‘Party and government decisions on economic issues, 1917 – 1967’ in 5 volumes (specifically vol. 5 that covers 1962-1965). Available at: https://docs.historyrussia.org/ru/nodes/343700-resheniya-partii-i-pravitelstva-po-hozyaystvennym-voprosam-t-5-1962-1965-gg (in Russian). Specifically resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR ‘On improving planning and strengthening economic stimulation of industrial production’ №729 from 4.10.1965 is available at: https://www.docs.historyrussia.org/ru/nodes/413589-postanovlenie-tsentralnogo-komiteta-kpss-i-soveta-ministrov-sssr-o-sovershenstvovanii-planirovaniya-i-usilenii-ekonomicheskogo-stimulirovaniya-promyshlennogo-proizvodstva-4-oktyabrya-1965-g-locale-nil-729 (in Russian). ↩︎
30. Osin, 2022a ↩︎
31. Arkhangelskaya, N., 2011. On some reasons for the restoration of capitalism in the USSR. Production relations in the USSR in 1960-1980. Available at: https://rksmb.org/articles/ideology/o_nekotorih_prichinah_restavratsii_kapitalizma_v_sssr_proizvodstvennie_otnoshenia_v_sssr_v_1960-1980_gg/ (in Russian). ↩︎
32. Lazareva, L., 2021. The 1965 economic reform: premises, course, results. Moscow: Moscow Region State University. p. 276 (in Russian) ↩︎
33. Grossman G., 1977. The “Second economy” of the USSR. Problems of communism. Sept.-Oct. 1977, p. 35. Cited from Khanin, G., 2008. Economic history of Russia in modern time: Soviet economy from the end 1930s to 1987. Vol. 1, p. 349. Available at: https://istmat.org/node/56774 (in Russian). ↩︎
34. Khanin, 2008, p.351 ↩︎
35. Arkhangelskaya, 2011 ↩︎
36. Khanin, 2008,, p. 399. ↩︎
37. Ibid, p. 396.National income growth rates are calculated by Khanin based on the numbers in Khanin, G., 1988. Economic Growth in the USSR. Alternative assessment. Kommunist, 1988, 7 (in Russian) ↩︎
38. Ibid., p. 398 ↩︎
39. Andropov, Iu., 1983. The Teachings of Karl Marx and the Problems of Socialist Construction in the USSR. Soviet Studies in Philosophy, 22(2), pp. 3-27. Available at: https://sci-hub.se/10.2753/rsp1061-196722023 ↩︎
40. Ibid. ↩︎
41. CPSU, 1983. On additional measures to expand the rights of industrial associations (enterprises) in planning and economic activity and to strengthen their responsibility for the results of work. Decree of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers No. 659 of 14.07.1983. Available at: https://docs.historyrussia.org/ru/nodes/347637-postanovlenie-tsk-kpss-i-soveta-ministrov-sssr-14-iyulya-1983-g-o-dopolnitelnyh-merah-po-rasshireniyu-prav-proizvodstvennyh-obedineniy-predpriyatiy-promyshlennosti-v-planirovanii-i-hozyaystvennoy-deyatelnosti-i-po-usileniyu-ih-otvetstvennosti-za-rezu (in Russian). ↩︎
42. Bobkov, V., Segreev, A. et. al., 1990. Alternative: path choice: Governance restructuring and market horizons. Moscow: Mysl (in Russian);Khanin, G., 2010. Economic history of Russia in modern time: Economics of USSR and RSFSR in 1988–1991. Novosibirsk: Novosibirsk State Technical University. Vol. 2, pp. 13; 279-301. Available at: https://istmat.org/node/56774 (in Russian). ↩︎
43. See e.g. Gorbachev, M., 1987. Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World.The XXI Congress of the All-Union Leninist Young Communist League changed its official ideology from Marxism-Leninism to Democratic socialism. ↩︎
44. Resolutions of the СС CPSU, Council of Ministers of the USSR dated August 19, 1986 “On measures to improve the management of foreign economic relations. On measures to improve the management of economic and scientific-technical co-operation with socialist countries”. Recital available at: https://docs.historyrussia.org/ru/nodes/347878-postanovleniya-tsk-kpss-i-soveta-ministrov-sssr-19-avgusta-1986-g-o-merah-po-sovershenstvovaniyu-upravleniya-vneshneekonomicheskimi-svyazyami-o-merah-po-sovershenstvovaniyu-upravleniya-ekonomicheskim-i-nauchno-tehnicheskim-sotrudnichestvom-s-sotsialisticheskimi (in Russian) ↩︎
45. CPSU, 1987. On the transfer of enterprises and organizations in sectors of the national economy to full self-financing and self-financing. Resolution of the СС CPSU, Council of Ministers of the USSR, No. 665, June 11, 1987. Available at: https://www.libussr.ru/doc_ussr/usr_14046.htm (in Russian) ↩︎
46. USSR, 1986. On Individual Labour Activity. Law of the USSR, November 19, 1986. Available at: https://docs.historyrussia.org/ru/nodes/347895 (in Russian);USSR, 1988. On Cooperation in the USSR. Law of the USSR, May 26, 1988. Available at: https://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_1361/ (in Russian);Kommersant, 2017. The first Soviet millionaire Artem Tarasov died. Kommersant, 25 July. Available at: https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/3365723 (in Russian). ↩︎
47. Gerashchenko, V., 1989. Report on the Work of the State System of Banks of the USSR for 1989. In: Through the pages of the archive foundations the Central Bank of Russian Federation, vol. 11: Lending and settlements in 1952-1991. pp. 175-177. Available at: https://www.cbr.ru/Content/Document/File/48223/ArchivalFonds_011.pdf (in Russian). ↩︎
48. Law of the USSR ‘On the State Bank of the USSR’ from 11.12.1990 N 1828-1., art. 27. Available at: https://www.consultant.ru/cons/cgi/online.cgi?req=doc;base=ESU;n=3493#zXUHLDUyLHHVwyjK3 (in Russian).Federal Law ‘On Banks and Banking Activities’ dated 02.12.1990 N 395-1. Available at: https://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_5842/ (in Russian). ↩︎
49. Central Bank of the Russian Federation (CBR), 1993. Годовой отчет Центрального банка Российской Федерации за 1992 год [Annual Report of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation for 1992]. Moscow: CBR. Available at: https://www.cbr.ru/Collection/Collection/File/7821/ar_1992.pdf (in Russian). ↩︎
50. Shcherbakov, V., 1991. Note on urgent measures to normalize finances and monetary circulation in the country. Available at: http://gaidar-arc.ru/file/bulletin-1/DEFAULT/org.stretto.plugins.bulletin.core.Article/file/2612 (in Russian). ↩︎
51. See Belovezha Accords and Alma-Ata Protocol. ↩︎
52. Batov, A., Markov., S., E.S., Magov, A. and Orlov, V., 2007. Modern Russian imperialism. RKSM(b), 9 January. Available at: https://rksmb.org/articles/ideology/sovremennyiy-rossiyskiy-imperializm/ (in Russian). ↩︎
53. Federal State Statistics Service, n.d. National accounts. Available at: https://rosstat.gov.ru/statistics/accounts (in Russian). ↩︎
54. Council of Ministers of the USSR. Resolution N 619 dated 8 August 1989. On Establishment of the State Gas Concern “Gazprom”. Available at: https://normativ.kontur.ru/document?moduleId=1&documentId=63414 (in Russian);Resolution of the Council of Ministers – Government of the Russian Federation No. 138 dated 17 February 1993 ‘On Establishment of the Russian Joint Stock Company Gazprom’. Available at: https://base.garant.ru/1566400/ (in Russian). ↩︎
55. Semikashev, V., Gayvoronskaya, M., 2022. Analysis of the State and Development Prospects of the Russian Gas Industry before and after 2022. Scientific Works: Institute of Economic Forecasting of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 2022, pp. 108-127. Available at: https://ecfor.ru/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/rossijskaya-gazovaya-otrasl-posle-2022.pdf (in Russian). ↩︎
56. Statista research department, 2024. Share of Gazprom in global natural gas production from 2009 to 2021. Available at: https://www.statista.com/statistics/350646/natural-gas-production-share-of-gazprom-globally/Statista research department, 2024. Share of Gazprom in natural gas reserves worldwide from 2009 to 2021. Available at: https://www.statista.com/statistics/350634/natural-gas-reserve-share-of-gazprom-globally/ ↩︎
57. Rosneft, n.d. Rosneft Today. Available at: https://www.rosneft.ru/about/Glance/ (in Russian). ↩︎
58. Kozlov, D., 2023. How we pumped to this. Kommersant, 10 January. Available at: https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/5759357 (in Russian);TASS, 2023. ‘Tatneft’ increased oil production by almost 5% in 2022. Available at: https://tass.ru/ekonomika/17313713 (in Russian). ↩︎
59. Russian National Committee of the World Petroleum Council, n.d. PJSC “Transneft”. Available at: https://rus-petroleum.ru/en/founder/36-pjsc-transneft.html ↩︎
60. Rosneft, n.d. Operational structure. Available at: https://www.rosneft.ru/about/Glance/OperationalStructure/ (in Russian);Gazprom Mezhregiongaz, n.d. Daughter companies. Available at: https://mrg.gazprom.ru/list-items/ (in Russian) ↩︎
61. Nornickel. Annual report 2023. Available at: https://ar2023.nornickel.com/download/full-reports/ar_en_annual-report_pages_nornickel_2023.pdf ↩︎
62. Rusal, 2024. Rusal announces results for the year ended 31 December 2023. Press release, 15 March 2024. Available at: https://rusal.ru/sustainability/social-investment/index-gorodov/15.03.2024_RUSAL%20announces%20its%202023%20results.pdfRusal, n.d. High purity aluminium. Available at: https://rusal.ru/en/clients/catalog/alyuminiy-vysokoy-i-super-chistoty/ ↩︎
63. Rusal, 2024. Rusal announces results for the year ended 31 December 2023. Press release, 15 March 2024. Available at: https://rusal.ru/sustainability/social-investment/index-gorodov/15.03.2024_RUSAL%20announces%20its%202023%20results.pdfRusal, n.d. High purity aluminium. Available at: https://rusal.ru/en/clients/catalog/alyuminiy-vysokoy-i-super-chistoty/ ↩︎
64. Rusal, 2024. Rusal announces results for the year ended 31 December 2023. Press release, 15 March 2024. Available at: https://rusal.ru/sustainability/social-investment/index-gorodov/15.03.2024_RUSAL%20announces%20its%202023%20results.pdfRusal, n.d. High purity aluminium. Available at: https://rusal.ru/en/clients/catalog/alyuminiy-vysokoy-i-super-chistoty/ ↩︎
65. Acra, 2021. Full rating report on EVRAZ plc. Available at: https://www.acra-ratings.ru/press-releases/2442/ (in Russian). ↩︎
66. Lenin, 1917a, ch.1 ↩︎
67. TASS, 2017. Russian government approves sale of Rostec shares in Kalashnikov Corporation. TASS, 5 December. Available at: https://tass.com/defense/979184 ↩︎
68. Zibrova, A. and Nikolskii A., 2016. Uralvagonzavod will be transferred to Rostec. Vedomosti, 27 December. Available at: https://www.vedomosti.ru/business/articles/2016/12/28/671495-uralvagonzavod-rostehu (in Russian); Nacimbio, n.d. About company. Available at: https://nacimbio.ru/en/about/activity/ ↩︎
69. Russian Helicopters, n.d. About the company. Available at: https://www.rhc.ru/en/ ↩︎
70. Transport Russia, 2024. Strategic Priorities. Maritime transport. Available at: https://transportrussia.ru/razdely/morskoj-transport/10828-strategicheskie-prioritety.html (in Russian). ↩︎
71. Nikitina, O., 2022. “Mobilization notices are sent out regardless of value” – Konstantin Babkin, co-owner of Rostselmash, on fitting in and mobilisation. Kommersant, 11 October. Available at: https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/5606847 (in Russian). ↩︎
72. Power Machines, n.d. Reports. Available at: https://power-m.ru/en/investors/reports/#tab_178;Power Machines, n.d. Available at: https://power-m.ru/en/ ↩︎
73. Rosatom, n.d. About us. Available at: https://rosatom.ru/en/about-us/Rosatom, n.d. Projects. Available at: https://www.rosatom.ru/en/investors/projects/Rosatomflot, n.d. Available at: http://www.rosatomflot.ru/ (in Russian). ↩︎
74. Aeroflot, n.d. About the company. Available at: https://ir.aeroflot.com/company-overview/about-aeroflot/ (in Russian). ↩︎
75. Gazprombank Investments, 2024. MTS: an ecosystem for government, business and private customers. Available at: https://gazprombank.investments/blog/reviews/mts/ (in Russian).Interfax, 2023a. Russia’s Big Four cellular operators must cancel fees for distributing internet traffic via mobile phone tethering within a month – FAS. Interfax, 18 September. Available at: https://interfax.com/newsroom/top-stories/94655/ ↩︎
76. Yandex, n.d. About. Available at: https://yandex.com/company/general_info/yandex_today. ↩︎
77. Mingazov, S. and Rozhkov, R., 2023. Yandex to Train 350,000 IT-Skilled Specialists in Three Years. Forbes, 15 November. Available at: https://www.forbes.ru/tekhnologii/500431-andeks-za-tri-goda-podgotovit-350-000-vladeusih-it-navykami-specialistov (in Russian).Korochkina, A., 2024. The Ministry of Digital Development announced a 13% increase in the number of IT specialists in Russia. Forbes, 5 April. Available at: https://www.forbes.ru/tekhnologii/509761-mincifry-zaavilo-o-roste-kolicestva-it-specialistov-v-rossii-na-13 (in Russian). ↩︎
78. Zagorovskaia, Ia., 2023. Yandex.Taxi was recognised as the dominant company. Kommersant, 28 November. Available at: https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/6365244 (in Russian);Novikov, N., 2022. Yandex.Taxi took an 85 per cent share of the taxi market in Moscow in July 2022. Speedme, 4 August. Available at: https://speedme.ru/posts/id-50989-oqnylxumypt7l3606yxr (in Russian). ↩︎
79. Lenin, 1917a, ch. 2. ↩︎
80. Bank of Russia, 2023. List of systemically important credit institutions approved. Press release, 17 October 2023. Available at: http://www.cbr.ru/eng/press/pr/?id=39559 ↩︎
81. Sherunkova, O., 2022. Otkritie has come to an end. Kommersant, 28 December. Available at: https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/5748673 (in Russian);VTB, 2024. Integration on the plus side: what Otkritie clients will get when they switch to VTB. Kommersant, 22 July. Available at: https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/6848497 (in Russian). ↩︎
82. Bank of Russia, n. d. Banking sector. Statistics. Available at: https://www.cbr.ru/banking_sector/statistics/ (in Russian). ↩︎
83. Bank of Russia, 2024. Statistical indicators of the banking sector of the Russian Federation. N 261 May 2024. Table 8. Available at: https://www.cbr.ru/Collection/Collection/File/50539/obs_261.xlsx (in Russian). ↩︎
84. Ibid, table 3. ↩︎
85. Bank of Russia, 2024. Banking sector analytical review. IV quarter 2023. p.2 and 4. Available at: https://www.cbr.ru/collection/collection/file/48978/analytical_review_bs-2023-4.pdf (in Russian);Koshkina, Yu., 2024. Sberbank earns a record ₽1.5 trillion net profit in 2023. RBC, 17 January. Available at: https://www.rbc.ru/finances/17/01/2024/65a780099a79476780128c10 (in Russian);Chernyshova, E., 2024. Central Bank forecasts record net profit of banks in 2024. RBC, 18 July. Available at: https://www.rbc.ru/finances/18/06/2024/6671ace59a7947396bde69ee (in Russian). ↩︎
86. Bank of Russia, 2024, p.2.Bank of Russia, 2019. Volume of Loans in Rubles Granted by 30 Largest Banks to Resident Legal Entities and Individual Entrepreneurs, by Economic Activity and Use of Funds. Available at: https://www.cbr.ru/eng/statistics/table/?tableId=302-01-G30Inflation in Russia, n.d. Table of inflation rates by month on an annual basis. Available at: https://xn—-ctbjnaatncev9av3a8f8b.xn--p1ai/%D1%82%D0%B0%D0%B1%D0%BB%D0%B8%D1%86%D1%8B-%D0%B8%D0%BD%D1%84%D0%BB%D1%8F%D1%86%D0%B8%D0%B8 (in Russian). ↩︎
87. Lenin, 1917a, ch. 3. ↩︎
88. Finmarket, n.d. Interfax-100. Russian banks. Key performance indicators – Q2 2024. Available at: https://www.finmarket.ru/database/rankings/ (in Russian);National Credit Ratings, 2023. NKR affirmed SOGAZ’s credit rating at AAA.ru with a stable outlook. Press release, 16 May 2023. Available at: https://ratings.ru/ratings/press-releases/Sogaz-RA-160523/ (in Russian);Gazprom Media, n.d. Available at: https://www.gazprom-media.com/en/Gazprom Media, n.d. About us. Available at: https://www.gazprom-media.com/en/aboutVedomosti, 2021. Gazprom-Media became a shareholder of VK. Vedomosti, 3 December. Available at: https://www.vedomosti.ru/business/news/2021/12/03/898794-gazprom-media-stal-aktsionerom-vk (in Russian). ↩︎
89. Finuslugi, n.d. Dossier of the Russian Regional Development Bank. Available at: https://finuslugi.ru/banki/vbrr (in Russian).Finuslugi, n.d. Dossier of the Surgutneftegazbank. Available at: https://finuslugi.ru/banki/surgutneftegazbank (in Russian). ↩︎
90. Levinsky, A. and Abakumova, M., 2020. “Operation “Vaccination”: Forbes figured out who and how will vaccinate Russians against COVID-19. Forbes, 2 December. Available at: https://www.forbes.ru/biznes/415213-operaciya-vakcinaciya-forbes-razobralsya-kto-i-kak-budet-privivat-rossiyan-ot-covid-19 (in Russian);Ganzhur, E. and Yuzbekova, J., 2020. Sber buys 45% of Eapteka. Forbes, 22 October. Available at: https://www.forbes.ru/biznes/411983-sber-pokupaet-45-eapteka (in Russian);Mingazov, S., 2023. Sber Eapteka will launch a special service for online sales of medicines in instalments. Forbes, 17 September. Available at: https://www.forbes.ru/tekhnologii/496618-sber-eapteka-zapustit-special-nyj-servis-dla-onlajn-prodaz-lekarstv-v-rassrocku (in Russian). ↩︎
91. Tadviser, n.d. Dossier of the SberInterteyment. Available at: https://tadviser.com/index.php/Company:SberInterteymentTadtaev, G., Efimovich, E. and Chernyshova, E., 2020. Sberbank became the sole owner of Rambler. RBC, 29 October. Available at: https://www.rbc.ru/business/29/10/2020/5f9af8339a79470b67836406 (in Russian). ↩︎
92. SberCRM, 2022. Sber helps property developers manage construction more efficiently. Kommersant, 28 June. Available at: https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/5435106 (in Russian).RusDevelopers, 2021. Sberbank’s construction sites. RusDevelopers, 20 January. Available at: https://rusdevelopers.ru/genpodryadchiki-moskvy/obekty-stroitelstva-sberbank-4-krupneishikh-stroyashikhsya-proekta-v-moskve (in Russian). ↩︎
93. TASS, 2023. Sber will finance the production of Chinese brand cars in Russia for 10 billion roubles. TASS, 6 July. Available at: https://tass.ru/ekonomika/18204185 (in Russian);Romanova, Ia., 2024. Sber again put its pharmaceutical plant in Konnaya Lakhta up for auction. Vedomosti, 9 July. Available at: https://spb.vedomosti.ru/business/articles/2024/07/09/1048889-sber-torgi-farmzavod (in Russian);Interfax, 2024b. Vladivostok 2000 floating fish factory sold to Sber Group at a price 8 times lower than originally planned. Interfax, 10 July. Available at: https://www.interfax.ru/business/970094 (in Russian). ↩︎
94. Matveev, K., 2024. Technology, range, regions: how the e-grocery market is developing. RBC, 4 April. Available at: https://www.rbc.ru/industries/news/660a7c599a794770a23ea160 (in Russian). ↩︎
95. TASS, 2023. What is known about the transfer of OSK to VTB trust management. TASS, 10 August. Available at: https://tass.ru/ekonomika/18484079 (in Russian). ↩︎
96. Gazprombank Investments, 2024a. MTS. Available at: https://gazprombank.investments/blog/reviews/mts/ (in Russian);MTS Bank, n. d. About the bank. Available at: https://www.mtsbank.ru/o-banke/ (in Russian);Gazprombank Investments, 2024b. Segezha Group. Available at: https://gazprombank.investments/blog/reviews/segezha-group/ (in Russian). ↩︎
97. Interfax, 2024c. Vostok Investments became the owner of Baring Vostok’s stake in Ozon marketplace. Interfax, 12 April. Available at: https://www.interfax.ru/business/955605 (in Russian);Forbes, 2024. 30 most expensive Runet companies. Available at: https://www.forbes.ru/tekhnologii/506710-30-samyh-dorogih-kompanij-runeta-2024-rejting-forbes (in Russian);Sitiukov, A., Anisimova, N., 2024. FAS assessed the market shares of Wildberries and Ozon. RBC, 6 March. Available at: https://www.rbc.ru/business/06/03/2024/65e7b3b89a79477643ff7b8b (in Russian). ↩︎
98. Filatov, A., 2019. Sistema will become the largest shareholder of Etalon. Vedomosti, 20 February. Available at: https://www.vedomosti.ru/realty/articles/2019/02/19/794443-sistema-aktsionerom-etalona (in Russian);Interfax, 2023b. Sistema subsidiary closes acquisition of Russian hotels from Norway’s Wenaas. Interfax, 10 March. Available at: https://interfax.com/newsroom/top-stories/88565/ ↩︎
99. EuroChem, 2022. EuroChem Group statement on ownership and control. Press release, 21 June 2022. Available at: https://www.eurochemgroup.com/media-announcements/eurochem-group-statement-on-ownership-and-control/ ↩︎
100. Marx, K., 1894. Capital. Vol. 3., ch. 15. Available at: https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1894-c3/ch15.htm ↩︎
101. Lenin, V., 1917a, ch. 4;Bukharin, N., 1925. Imperialism and accumulation of capital. Moscow, Leningrad: State Publishing House of the RSFSR. Ch. 4. Available at: http://elib.shpl.ru/ru/nodes/53965-buharin-n-i-imperializm-i-nakoplenie-kapitala-teoreticheskiy-etyud-m-l-1925 (in Russian). ↩︎
102. Bulatov, A., 2017. Offshore orientation of Russian Federation FDI. Transnational Corporations, Vol 24, № 2. pp. 79-80 in particular. Available at: https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/diaeia2017d3a3_en.pdfSpanidis, T., 2022. On the political economy of contemporary imperialism. Availableat: https://kommunistischepartei.de/diskussion/on-the-political-economy-of-contemporary-imperialism/ ↩︎
103. EDB, 2023. EDB Monitoring of Mutual Investments. pp. 5-6, 14. Available at: https://eabr.org/upload/iblock/4dc/EDB_2023_Report-5_Monitoring-of-Mutual-Investments_eng.pdf ↩︎
104. EDB, 2022. EDB Monitoring of Mutual Investments. pp.7, 18. Available at: https://eabr.org/upload/iblock/002/EDB_2022_Report-5_Monitoring-of-Mutual-Investments_eng.pdf ↩︎
105. Crude Accountability, 2013. Republic of Chevron: 20 years in Kazakhstan. Available at: https://crudeaccountability.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/20130604-Chevron20YrsInKazakhstan-en.pdf.pdfFisher, D., 2003. ExxonMobil’s Kazakhstan Quagmire. Forbes, 23 April. Available at: https://www.forbes.com/2003/04/23/cz_df_0423xom.html ↩︎
106. Strana Rosatom, 2023. Rosatom has become the world’s second largest uranium producer. Strana Rosatom, 14 August. Available at: https://strana-rosatom.ru/2023/08/14/rosatom-vyshel-na-vtoroe-mesto-v-mire/ (in Russian). ↩︎
107. Kun.uz, 2023. Info about the amount paid to Uzbekistan by Lukoil within the framework of SRP provided. Kun.uz, 14 September. Available at: https://kun.uz/en/news/2023/09/14/info-about-the-amount-paid-to-uzbekistan-by-lukoil-within-the-framework-of-srp-provided ↩︎
108. Belgazprombank, 2024. Key financial indicators. Available at: https://belgazprombank.by/about/finansovie_pokazateli/osnovnie_pokazateli/ (in Russian);Alfa-bank, 2024. Alfa Bank disclosed its most important financial indicators for 2023. Available at: https://www.alfabank.by/about/articles/dvizhukha/alfa-bank-raskryl-vazhneyshie-finansovye-pokazateli-za-2023-god/ (in Russian);VTB, 2024. Net profit of VTB (Belarus) reached BYR 96.5 mln by the end of 2023. Press release, 6 June 2024. Available at: https://www.vtb.by/press-centr/press-relizy/chistaya-pribyl-vtb-belarus-dostigla-965-mln-belorusskih-rubley-po-itogam-2023-goda (in Russian);Prime Press, 2024. Belarusian banks increased profits to 2.94 bln Belarusian roubles in 2023. Prime Press, 1 February. Available at: https://primepress.by/news/finansi/belorusskie_banki_narastili_pribyl_do_2_94_mlrd_bel_rub_za_2023_g-51887/ (in Russian). ↩︎
109. Gazprom Transgaz Belarus, n.d. About the company. Available at: https://belarus-tr.gazprom.ru/about/ (in Russian)Sputnik, 2024. Gazprom’s subsidiary in Belarus will not pay dividends. Sputnik Belarus, 5 April. Available at: https://sputnik.by/20240405/dochernyaya-kompaniya-gazproma-v-belarusi-ne-vyplatit-dividendy-1085233579.html (in Russian). ↩︎
110. First channel news. For the first time, largest source of foreign direct investment in Armenia is UAE, Russia is in second place: Kerobyan. First channel news, 3 November. Available at: https://www.1lurer.am/en/2023/11/03/For-the-first-time-largest-source-of-foreign-direct-investment-in-Armenia-is-UAE-Russia-is-in-secon/1024467EDB, 2023, p. 28. ↩︎
111. Embassy of the Russian Federation to the Republic of Armenia, 2019. Trade and economic co-operation. Available at: https://armenia.mid.ru/ru/countries/bilateral-relations/trade-economic-cooperation/ (in Russian);Interfax, 2016a. Sberbank Capital increases stake in GeoProMining to 31.47%. Interfax, 5 July. Available at: https://interfax.com/newsroom/top-stories/31630/;Electric Networks of Armenia, n.d. About us. Available at: https://www.ena.am/AboutUs.aspx?hid=38&lang=2 ↩︎
112. EDB, 2023, p. 29. ↩︎
113. Ibid., p. 28. ↩︎
114. Azertag, 2024. Azerbaijan submits formal application for BRICS membership. Available at: https://azertag.az/en/xeber/azerbaijan_submits_formal_application_for_brics_membership-3144374Kremlin, 2024. Vladimir Putin has arrived to Baku. Available at: http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/74878 (in Russian). ↩︎
115. EDB, 2012. Monitoring of mutual investments in the CIS. Available at: https://eabr.org/upload/iblock/da3/edb-report-6_eng.pdf ↩︎
116. Kaliukov, E., 2015. LUKOIL closed the deal to sell gas stations in Ukraine. RBC, 29 April. Available at: https://www.rbc.ru/business/29/04/2015/5540f8e19a79478a23e85b5e (in Russian);Interfax, 2016b. Transneft sold the Ukrainian oil product pipeline. Interfax, 15 March. Available at: https://www.interfax.ru/business/498580 (in Russian);Severstal, 2017a. “Severstal” announced the sale of the Ukrainian enterprise “Dneprometiz”. RBC, 27 October. Available at: https://quote.rbc.ru/news/article/5ae098102ae5961b67a1a67d (in Russian);Fadeeva, A., 2017b. Ukrainian authorities nationalized Sergei Kurchenko’s Odessa oil refinery. RBC, 19 June. Available at: https://www.rbc.ru/business/19/06/2017/5947ba779a794738d5cb0641 (in Russian). ↩︎
117. Bukharin, 1925, p. 119 ↩︎
118. Ponomarev, D., 2004. Severstal bought Rouge Industries. Kommersant, 2 February. Available at: https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/445722 (in Russian). ↩︎
119. Autonews, 2006. Lukoil bought a network of 376 gas stations in Eastern Europe. Autonews, 19 December. Available at: https://www.autonews.ru/news/5825a36c9a79474743127521 (in Russian);Lukoil, 2003. Expansion of Sales Network in Europe. Available at: https://www.lukoil.com/Company/history/History2003 ↩︎
120. IFX News, 2010. JSC United Machine-Building Plants is investing in the reconstruction of the Czech Pilsen Steel. Forbes, 17 January. Available at: https://www.forbes.ru/news/38103-oao-obedinennye-mashinostroitelnye-zavody-investiruet-sredstva-v-rekonstruktsiyu-cheshsko (in Russian);Interfax. Corporate information disclosure centre, n.d. United Heavy Machinery, affiliates. Available at: https://www.e-disclosure.ru/portal/files.aspx?id=249&type=6 (in Russian). ↩︎
121. Kobzeva, O. and Golubkova E., 2011. Sberbank bought an entrance ticket to Europe. Reuters, 8 September. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSRXE7870KD/ (in Russian). ↩︎
122. Kobzeva, O. and Golubkova E., 2011. Sberbank bought an entrance ticket to Europe. Reuters, 8 September. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSRXE7870KD/ (in Russian). ↩︎
123. Kurmayer, N., 2022. Rosneft subsidiary in Germany placed under state trusteeship. Euractiv, 16 September. Available at: https://www.euractiv.com/section/energy/news/rosneft-subsidiary-in-germany-placed-under-state-trusteeship/Lukoil, 2023. Lukoil completes sale of ISAB refinery in Italy. Available at: https://www.lukoil.com/PressCenter/Pressreleases/Pressrelease/lukoil-completes-sale-of-isab-refinery-in-italy;Piscioneri, F. and Landini, F., 2023. G.O.I Energy denies Russia links over Italian refinery. Reuters, 16 February. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/lukoil-goi-italy-idUSL8N34W5LH ↩︎
124. Kurmayer, 2022Smirnova, E., 2022. Rosneft revenue for 9 months according to IFRS increased by 15.7% — to 7.2 trillion rubles. RuNews24, 7 December. Available at: https://runews24.ru/economy/07/12/2022/8a17771647d3de971bdcc58797545923 (in Russian);Savenkova, D., 2022. Rosneft received record revenue and EBITDA in 9 months. Vedomosti, 7 December. Available at: https://www.vedomosti.ru/business/articles/2022/12/07/954167-rosneft-poluchila-ebitda (in Russian);Fontanka.ru, 2023a. Sechin: British BP still remains a shareholder of Rosneft. Fontanka.ru, 6 February. Available at: https://www.fontanka.ru/2023/02/06/72036392/ (in Russian).; ↩︎
125. Manekar, S. and Devitt P., 2023. Aluminium giant Rusal boosts Asia revenue but Europe remains a key market. Reuters, 7 December. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/aluminium-giant-rusal-net-profit-plunges-75-first-half-costs-surge-2023-08-11/ ↩︎
126. IFX News, 2010 ↩︎
127. Elliott, S., 2024. EU would ‘cope’ if Russian gas transit via Ukraine halted: EC’s Simson. S&P Global, 13 February. Available at: https://www.spglobal.com/commodityinsights/en/market-insights/latest-news/natural-gas/021324-eu-would-cope-if-russian-gas-transit-via-ukraine-halted-ecs-simson ↩︎
128. Baczynska, G., 2023. Exclusive: EU nuclear agency sees some Russia imports up again in 2023 from before Ukraine war. Reuters, 1 December. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/eu-nuclear-agency-sees-some-russia-imports-up-again-2023-before-ukraine-war-2023-12-01/ ↩︎
129. Natter, A., 2023. Russia Still Top US Uranium Supplier Despite Efforts to Wean Off. Bloomberg, 15 June. Available at: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-06-15/russia-still-top-us-uranium-supplier-despite-efforts-to-wean-off ↩︎
130. Lenin, 1917a, ch. 5. ↩︎
131. Chernyshova E., 2023. Sberbank left the European Union banking market. RBC, 16 June. Available at: https://www.rbc.ru/business/16/06/2023/648c4bcb9a79470a2dd5ba28 (in Russian);Damyanova, V. and Taqi, M., 2023. Russia-Ukraine war splinters Europe’s banking industry. S&P Global, 22 February. Available at: https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/news-insights/latest-news-headlines/russia-ukraine-war-splinters-europe-s-banking-industry-74075106 ↩︎
132. Council of the EU and the European Council, n.d. Where does the EU’s gas come from? [online] Available at: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/infographics/eu-gas-supply/ ↩︎
133. Lenin, V., 1915. On the Slogan for a United States of Europe. Available at: https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1915/aug/23.htm ↩︎
134. Council of the EU and the European Council, n.d. Where does the EU’s gas come from? Available at: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/infographics/eu-gas-supply/ ↩︎
135. Cradle, 2023a. Gazprom CEO visits Tehran to advance $40bn oil and gas deal. The Cradle, 1 March. Available at: https://new.thecradle.co/articles/gazprom-ceo-visits-tehran-to-advance-40bn-oil-and-gas-deal ↩︎
136. Escobar, P., 2023. The inside story of Russia-Iran-India connectivity. The Cradle, 23 May. Available at: https://new.thecradle.co/articles/the-inside-story-of-russia-iran-india-connectivity ↩︎
137. Kaleji, V., 2023. Financial cooperation between Iran and Russia: opportunities and limitations. Valdai Discussion Club, 20 September. Available at: https://ru.valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/finansovoe-sotrudnichestvo-mezhdu-iranom-i-rossiey/ (in Russian);Cradle, 2023b. Iran, Russia integrate banking systems. The Cradle, 30 January. Available at: https://new.thecradle.co/articles/iran-russia-connect-interbank-financial-systems-bypass-sanctions ↩︎
138. RIA, 2022. Russia and Iran agreed on cooperation on peaceful nuclear energy. RIA News, 13 July. Available at: https://ria.ru/20220713/iran-1802292549.html (in Russian). ↩︎
139. Fedyakina, A., 2016. Russian S-300 air defence systems covered Iran’s nuclear facility in Fordo. RG.RU, 29 August. Available at: https://rg.ru/2016/08/29/rossijskie-zrk-s-300-prikryli-iadernyj-obekt-irana-v-fordo.html (in Russian). ↩︎
140. Sitnikov, A., 2022. It became known how many Shahed UAVs Iran will supply to Russia. Svpressa, 16 August. Available at: https://svpressa.ru/war21/article/343248/ (in Russian). ↩︎
141. Vasilchenko, E., 2023. Iranian Ambassador: It would be good to deepen the Volga and launch North-South as soon as possible. News.ru, 30 January. Available at: https://news.ru/near-east/posol-irana-bylo-by-horosho-uglubit-volgu-i-skoree-zapustit-sever-yug/ (in Russian);RIA, 2023. More than 500 meetings were held as part of the Russian business mission to Iran. RIA News, 20 September. Available at: https://ria.ru/20230920/biznes-missiya-1897521130.html (in Russian). ↩︎
142. Alagha M., 2024. Analysis of Russia’s involvement in Syria from a political economy perspective. Available at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/378300867_Analysis_of_Russia’s_involvement_in_Syria_from_a_political_economy_perspective ↩︎
143. Ibid., pp. 364-365. ↩︎
144. Bulos, N., 2013. Russian firm signs 25-year energy deal with Syria. Los Angeles Times, 26 December. Available at: https://www.latimes.com/world/worldnow/la-fg-wn-russia-energy-oil-gas-syria-20131226-story.html ↩︎
145. RBC, 2015. Syrian firing range: what weapons Russia first used in Syria. RBC, 19 November. Available at: https://www.rbc.ru/politics/19/11/2015/564dde149a7947255482bfd8 (in Russian). ↩︎
146. Masters, J. and Merrow, W., 2024. U.S. Aid to Israel in Four Charts. CFR, 23 January. Available at: https://www.cfr.org/article/us-aid-israel-four-charts ↩︎
147. Czerny, M. and Storyev, D., 2023. Why Russia and Hamas Are Growing Closer. Carnegie Politika, 25 October. Available at: https://carnegieendowment.org/politika/90841 ↩︎
148. Al Jazeera, 2024. Palestinian unity on agenda as Hamas, Fatah leaders meet in Moscow. Al Jazeera, 29 February. Available at: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/2/29/palestinian-unity-on-agenda-as-hamas-fatah-leaders-to-meet-in-moscow ↩︎
149. Dagher, S. and Hatem, M., 2024. Yemen’s Houthis Tell China, Russia Their Ships Won’t Be Targeted. Bloomberg, 21 March. Available at: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-03-21/china-russia-reach-agreement-with-yemen-s-houthis-on-red-sea-ships ↩︎
150. Tsolova, T., 2020. Russia begins TurkStream gas flows to Greece, North Macedonia. Reuters, 5 January. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/business/russia-begins-turkstream-gas-flows-to-greece-north-macedonia-idUSKBN1Z40D8/ ↩︎
151. Tsolova, T., 2020. Russia begins TurkStream gas flows to Greece, North Macedonia. Reuters, 5 January. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/business/russia-begins-turkstream-gas-flows-to-greece-north-macedonia-idUSKBN1Z40D8/ ↩︎
152. EDB, 2023. pp. 39-40. ↩︎
153. Logirus, 2023. Russian capital is leading in Turkey. Logirus, 21 March. Available at: https://logirus.ru/news/custom_and_ved/rossiyskiy_kapital_v_turtsii_lidiruet.html (in Russian). ↩︎
154. Magid, P., 2024. Turkey’s drone maker Baykar begins to build plant in Ukraine. Reuters, 7 February. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/turkeys-drone-maker-baykar-begins-build-plant-ukraine-2024-02-06/ ↩︎
155. Pitel, L., 2022. Turkish banks suspend Russian Mir cards amid US sanctions pressure. Financial Times, 19 September. Available at: https://www.ft.com/content/e8865fd9-0268-43f1-b88a-cf311c567a01 ↩︎
156. TASS, 2022. Terrorists or freedom fighters? Who is Türkiye fighting against in Syria? TASS, 8 June. Available at: https://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/14840179 (in Russian). ↩︎
157. The Russia–Africa Summit, 2023. Declaration of the Second Russia–Africa Summit. Available at: https://summitafrica.ru/en/about-summit/declaration-2023/ ↩︎
158. Rosatom, 2023. Main Construction Phase for Unit 3 of El-Dabaa Nuclear Power Plant Commences in Egypt. Press release, 3 May 2023. Available at: https://rosatom.ru/en/press-centre/news/main-construction-phase-for-unit-3-of-el-dabaa-nuclear-power-plant-commences-in-egypt/Rosatom, n.d. Rosatom in Sub-Saharan Africa, history of cooperation. Available at: https://rosatomafrica.com/en/rosatom-in-country/history-of-cooperation/ ↩︎
159. Ivanov, M., 2023. Routes of the African Corps: Why Russia is expanding its military presence in Africa. African Initiative, 21 November. Available at: https://afrinz.ru/en/2023/11/routes-of-the-african-corps-why-russia-is-expanding-its-military-presence-in-africa/ ↩︎
160. TASS, 2019. Rosneft and Cuba are working on projects to improve the efficiency of mature fields. TASS, 2 October. Available at: https://tass.ru/ekonomika/6954540 (in Russian). ↩︎
161. Interfax, 2016c. Inter RAO signed a contract with Cuba for the construction of 4 power units. Interfax, 21 March. Available at: https://www.interfax.ru/business/499551 (in Russian);Smertina, P., 2019. Inter RAO will repair thermal power plants in Cuba. Kommersant, 21 March. Available at: https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/4101338 (in Russian);See e.g. Lenin, V., 1917a, ch. 4. ↩︎
162. Interfax, 2019. Russian Railways will modernize Cuban railways for 1.9 billion euros. Interfax, 3 October. Available at: https://www.interfax.ru/business/679049 (in Russian). ↩︎
163. Eurasian Economic Commission (EEC), n.d. Observer state status at the EAEU. Available at: https://eec.eaeunion.org/en/comission/department/dep_razv_integr/mezhdunarodnoe-sotrudnichestvo/o-statuse-gosudarstva-nablyudatelya.php;Castro, Y., 2024. Cuba y la Unión Económica Euroasiática coinciden en profundizar la integración y la cooperación. Granma, 2 February. Available at: https://www.granma.cu/mundo/2024-02-02/cuba-y-la-union-economica-euroasiatica-coinciden-en-profundizar-la-integracion-y-la-cooperacion-02-02-2024-10-02-57 (in Spanish);EEC, 2023. EEC and Cuba to continue developing industrial cooperation in Mariel special economic zone. EEC, 21 November. Available at: https://eec.eaeunion.org/en/news/eek-i-kuba-prodolzhat-rabotu-po-razvitiyu-promyshlennogo-sotrudnichestva-v-osoboy-ekonomicheskoy-zon/ ↩︎
164. TASS, 2015. Russia and China agree on the integration of Eurasian Economic Union, Silk Road projects. TASS, 8 May. Available at: https://tass.com/economy/793713 ↩︎
165. Chow, E., 2022. China section of Power of Siberia gas pipeline operational. Reuters, 8 December. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/china-gas-pipeline-idAFL1N32Y063 ↩︎
166. Rosen, P., 2023. Russia will sell natural gas to China at almost a 50% discount compared to European buyers. Business Insider, 8 September. Available at: https://markets.businessinsider.com/news/commodities/russia-china-energy-trade-discount-turkey-europe-buyers-ukraine-beijing-2023-9;Bloomberg News, 2024. Russia Forecasts Lower Price for Its Gas to China Versus Europe. Bloomberg, 23 April. Available at: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-04-23/russia-forecasts-lower-price-for-its-gas-to-china-versus-europe ↩︎
167. Interfax, 2023c. Legendagro starts exporting grain to China through Zarubino port. Interfax, 8 February. Available at: https://interfax.com/newsroom/top-stories/87748/;Interfax, 2023d. Legendagro to build a rapeseed processing plant in Krasnoyarsk Territory, invest 6 bln rubles. Interfax, 12 May. Available at: https://interfax.com/newsroom/top-stories/90455/;Reidy, S., 2023a. Russia, China agree to build new grain hub on border. World Grain, 9 December. Available at: https://www.world-grain.com/articles/19022-russia-china-agree-to-build-new-grain-hub-on-border;Khazheeva, M. and Gorbunova, E., 2023. China’s investments in Russia. Young science of Siberia, 4(22). Available at: https://ojs.irgups.ru/index.php/mns/article/view/1546 (in Russian). ↩︎
168. TASS, 2023a. Bank of Russia approves opening two Alfa Bank branches in China. TASS, 20 October. Available at: https://tass.com/economy/1694561;TASS, 2023b. Sberbank expects to open a branch in China by the end of 2023 — First Deputy CEO. TASS, 26 December. Available at: https://tass.com/economy/1556005 ↩︎
169. Rosatom, n.d. Projects. Available at: https://www.rosatom.ru/en/investors/projects/ ↩︎
170. Rosatom, 2023. ROSATOM and the Atomic Energy Agency of China signed the long-term cooperation program in the area of fast reactors and nuclear fuel cycle closure. Available at: https://www.rosatom.ru/en/press-centre/news/rosatom-and-the-atomic-energy-agency-of-china-signed-the-long-term-cooperation-program-in-the-area-o/ ↩︎
171. Beijing newsroom, 2024. China-Russia 2023 trade value hits record high of $240 bln – Chinese customs. Reuters, 12 January. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/markets/china-russia-2023-trade-value-hits-record-high-240-bln-chinese-customs-2024-01-12/ ↩︎
172. Knobel, A. and Firanchuk, A., 2023. The preliminary results of Russia’s foreign trade in 2023: Trade turnover with China. Monitoring of Russia’s economic outlook, 10(106), pp. 7-11 (p. 8). Available at: https://www.iep.ru/files/RePEc/gai/mreoen/mreoen-2023-10-1316.pdf ↩︎
173. Ibid., pp. 9-10. ↩︎
174. RKSM(b), 2022. Statement of the CC of the RKSM(b) – against the imperialist repartition of Ukraine! Available at: https://rksmb.org/english/revolutionary-komsomol-against-the-imperialist-repartition-of-ukraine/;RKSM(b), 2024. Statement of the CC of the RKSM(b) on the second anniversary of the SMO. Available at: https://rksmb.org/english/statement-of-the-cc-of-the-rksmb-on-the-second-anniversary-of-the-smo/ ↩︎
175. EDB, 2012. ↩︎
176. Kirillov D., 2017. Donbass takes away the assets of the oligarchs. Gazeta.ru, 11 February. Available at: https://www.gazeta.ru/politics/2017/02/11_a_10520915.shtml (in Russian). ↩︎
177. Faiola A. and Bennett D., 2022. In the Ukraine war, a battle for the nation’s mineral and energy wealth. The Washington post, 11 August. Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/08/10/ukraine-russia-energy-mineral-wealth ↩︎
178. Lenin, V., 1917a, ch. 6. ↩︎
179. Soldatenko, M., 2023. Economy of the new territories. Whose business is now in Kherson and Zaporizhzhya regions. Fontanka.ru, 4 July. Available at: https://www.fontanka.ru/2023/07/04/72459416/ (in Russian). ↩︎
180. Vzglyad, 2023. Key industry of the new territories of Russia. Vzglyad, 17 April. Available at: https://vz.ru/infographics/2023/4/17/1207934.html (in Russian). ↩︎
181. Churikov K., 2024. New regions are increasing their industry potential. VGTRK, 6 March. Video available at: https://smotrim.ru/video/2771108 (in Russian). ↩︎
182. Zinkovskaia, A., 2024. 160 factories have been launched in new regions of Russia since 2022. RBK, 22 March. Available at: https://rostov.rbc.ru/rostov/freenews/65fd624b9a79473b870d50fe (in Russian). ↩︎
183. Gavrilyuk S. and Sintsova N., 2023. Donetsk authorities will rent out coal mines. Vedomosti, 9 March. https://www.vedomosti.ru/business/articles/2023/03/09/965718-donetskie-vlasti-sdadut-ugolnie-shahti-v-arendu (in Russian). ↩︎
184. Audit, 2024. Dossier on counterparty OOO “UGMK”. Available at: https://www.audit-it.ru/contragent/122x9400000158_ooo-yugmk (in Russian). ↩︎
185. Audit, 2024a. Dossier on counterparty OOO “Staleks-Zapad”. Available at: https://www.audit-it.ru/contragent/1216100002161_ooo-staleks-zapad (in Russian);Audit, 2024b. Dossier on counterparty OOO TD “Gornyak”. Available at: https://www.audit-it.ru/contragent/1132468066818_ooo-td-gornyak (in Russian);Soldatenko, M., 2022. Ministers, billionaires and artists. Who holds the visible part of the business on new territories. Fontanka.ru, 3 July. Available at: https://www.fontanka.ru/2023/07/03/72455996/ (in Russian). ↩︎
186. Churmanova K. and Goryanov A., 2023. Factory in Mariupol and OBI stores. How a businessman close to Ramzan Kadyrov receives foreign business during the war. BBC Russian service, 13 February. Available at: https://www.bbc.com/russian/features-64599582 (in Russian);Kolisnichenko V., 2021. Ilyich iron and steel works received UAH 16.6 billion in profit in January-September. GMK Center, 1 November. Available at: https://gmk.center/news/mmk-im-ilicha-v-yanvare-sentyabre-poluchil-16-6-mlrd-grn-pribyli/ (in Russian and Ukrainian);RBC, 2023. Ilyich Combine in Mariupol resumes work after demining. RBC, 13 December. Available at: https://www.rbc.ru/rbcfreenews/657913bd9a79476beedf6713 (in Russian). ↩︎
187. TASS, 2023c. Roskapstroy announced that the Azovsteel plant in Mariupol will not be restored. TASS, 24 January. Available at: https://tass.ru/ekonomika/16871883 (in Russian). ↩︎
188. Semenov S., 2023. New Russian Field. Farmers of Zaporizhia, Kherson region and Donbass are integrating into the general economic space of the Russian Federation. Vestnik APK, 12 October. Available at: https://vestnikapk.ru/articles/aktualno/novoe-russkoe-pole/ (in Russian). ↩︎
189. RBC Companies, 2024. Dossier on counterparty SHA PZ “Stepnoy”. Available at: https://companies.rbc.ru/id/1022200864586-selskohozyajstvennaya-artel-selskohozyajstvennaya-artel-kolhoz-plemzavod-stepnoj/ (in Russian);Audit, 2024. Dossier on counterparty OOO “Berdyanskie kolbasy”. Available at: https://www.audit-it.ru/contragent/1229000002549_ooo-berdyanskie-kolbasy (in Russian). ↩︎
190. Chekko, 2024. Dossier on counterparty GUP “Tavriya-Energo”. Available at: https://checko.ru/company/gup-tavriya-ehnergo-1229000019467 (in Russian). ↩︎
191. Obyasnyaem, 2024. More than 500 large industrial enterprises are already operating in Donbass and Novorossiya. Obyasnyaem, 5 March. Available at: https://объясняем.рф/articles/news/v-donbasse-i-novorossii-uzhe-rabotayut-bolee-500-krupnykh-promyshlennykh-predpriyatiy-/ (in Russian) ↩︎
192. Oil Capital, 2023. Donbass is a territory with great potential. Oil Capital, 20 January. Available at: https://oilcapital.ru/news/2023-01-20/donbass-territoriya-s-bolshim-potentsialom-2642279 (in Russian). ↩︎
193. Bobylyov S., 2024. Putin called on large Russian banks to start working in Donbass and Novorossiya. TASS, 31 January. Available at: https://tass.ru/ekonomika/19870567 (in Russian). ↩︎
194. Opendatabot, 2024a. Earnings of leaders of the energy sector of Ukraine increased by 8%. Available at: https://opendatabot.ua/analytics/index-electricity-2024 (in Ukrainian). ↩︎
195. Opendatabot, 2024b. 13% more earned by the mining industry leaders in 2023. Available at: https://opendatabot.ua/analytics/index-mining-industry-2024 (in Ukrainian). ↩︎
196. Monopolist, 2023. Under the leadership of Lippa, OGTSU purchased a record volume of gas at high prices. Monopolist [Telegram], 21 August. Available at: https://t.me/monopolistua/1148 (in Ukrainian). ↩︎
197. Opendatabot, 2024c. Processing industry leaders increased revenue by 23% per year. Available at: https://opendatabot.ua/analytics/index-manufacturing-2024 (in Ukrainian). ↩︎
198. Culverwell, D., 2024. Why are Ukrainian banks so profitable during war? Kyiv Independent, 11 June. Available at: https://kyivindependent.com/why-are-ukrainian-banks-so-profitable-during-war/ ↩︎
199. Zharikova, A., 2023. Ukraine Increased Grain Exports During War Year: Who Bought the Most. Ekonomicheskaya pravda, 3 July. https://www.epravda.com.ua/rus/news/2023/07/3/701827/ (in Russian). ↩︎
200. Kernel, 2021. Kernel annual report for the year ended 30 June 2021. Available at: https://www.kernel.ua/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/FY2021_Kernel_Annual_Report.pdf ↩︎
201. Interfax Ukraine, 2023. Kernel invested $44.15 million in strengthening logistics for transshipment of vegetable oils in the ports of Chernomorsk and Reni. Interfax Ukraine, 21 August. Available at: https://ru.interfax.com.ua/news/investments/930049.html (in Russian). ↩︎
202. Interfax Ukraine, 2023. Kernel announced the beginning of the placement of shares for $60 million among qualified investors. Interfax Ukraine, 22 August. https://interfax.com.ua/news/investments/930224.html (in Russian). ↩︎
203. RIA, 2024. Gas supply via Ukraine to the Sudzha remains at maximum. RIA News, 31 August. Available at: https://ria.ru/20240831/gaz-1969645186.html (in Russian). ↩︎
204. Begal, I. and Zarazhevska, S., 2023b. “Catch up so you don’t overpay for 2024.” Prices will fall to the ground and grow during the war. Why and how much can you earn? Forbes, 14 April. Available at: https://forbes.ua/money/vstignuti-shchob-ne-pereplatiti-u-2024-mu-tsini-ta-popit-na-zemlyu-zrostayut-popri-viynu-chomu-ta-skilki-na-tsomu-mozhna-zarobiti-14042023-13039 (in Ukrainian);Oakland Institute, 2023. War and Theft: The takeover of Ukraine’s agricultural land. pp. 8-10. Available at: https://www.oaklandinstitute.org/sites/oaklandinstitute.org/files/takeover-ukraine-agricultural-land.pdf ↩︎
205. RBC, 2024d. Limits have increased, access has expanded. What to expect from the second stage of land reform in 2024. RBC News Ukraine, 1 January. Available at: https://www.rbc.ua/ukr/news/limiti-zrosli-dostup-rozshireno-chogo-chekati-1703766698.html (in Russian). ↩︎
206. Drea, E., 2023. The EU is leading Ukraine into a sovereign debt crisis. Politico, January 23. Available at: https://www.politico.eu/article/european-union-ukraine-war-debt-crisis-aid-loans-18-billion/ ↩︎
207. Coi, G. and Mackenzie, L., 2024. Ukraine’s funding gap — by the numbers. Politico, 25 January. Available at: https://www.politico.eu/article/ukraine-war-funding-budget-defense-european-union/ ↩︎
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209. NATO, 2024. Defence expenditures and NATO’s 2% guideline. Available at: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49198.htm ↩︎
210. Sonnenfeld J. A. and Tian S., 2024. What the U.S. has to gain from supporting Ukraine. Yale Insights, 15 February. Available at: https://insights.som.yale.edu/insights/what-the-us-has-to-gain-from-supporting-ukraine ↩︎
211. Chamonikolas K. and Dudik, A., 2024. Arming Ukraine Turns Soviet Tank Refitter Into a Billionaire. Bloomberg, 15 April. Available at: https://financialpost.com/pmn/business-pmn/arming-ukraine-turns-soviet-tank-refitter-into-a-billionaire ↩︎
212. China Military Online, 2024. US’s act of reaping huge profits from war worth vigilance. China Military Online, 11 March. Available at: http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/OPINIONS_209196/Opinions_209197/16293064.html ↩︎
213. U. S. Department of Defense, 2023. Report on Defense Spending by State in Fiscal Year 2022. Available at: https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3538311/dod-releases-report-on-defense-spending-by-state-in-fiscal-year-2022/ ↩︎
214. Raytheon Technologies, 2023. Raytheon Technologies Reports 2022 Results, Announces 2023 Outlook and Plan to Realign into Three Business Segments. Available at: https://investors.rtx.com/static-files/ce55ee31-0493-4d7a-9c99-9bf9d8c38d1e General Dynamics, 2023. General Dynamics Reports Fourth-Quarter and Full-Year 2022 Financial ResultsAvailable at: https://www.gd.com/Articles/2023/01/25/general-dynamics-reports-fourth-quarter-and-full-year-2022-financial-results ↩︎
215. Qiu, S., Gu, H. and Munroe, T., 2022. China’s business and economic interests in Ukraine. Reuters, 23 February. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/business/autos-transportation/chinas-business-economic-interests-ukraine-2022-02-23/ ↩︎
216. GFDC, n.d. Countries of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Available at: https://greenfdc.org/countries-of-the-belt-and-road-initiative-bri/ ↩︎
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218. Braw, E., 2022. Why does China own so much of Ukraine? Wall Street Journal, 29 June. Available at: https://www.wsj.com/amp/articles/why-does-china-own-so-much-ukraine-farming-land-exports-food-crisis-grow-wheat-production-sell-grain-territory-11656534819 ↩︎
219. Qiu et al., 2022. ↩︎
220. UN, n.d. Vessel movements. Available at: https://www.un.org/en/black-sea-grain-initiative/vessel-movements ↩︎
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224. Luxemburg, R., 1915. The Junius Pamphlet: The Crisis of German Social Democracy. Ch. 1. Available at: https://www.marxists.org/archive/luxemburg/1915/junius/ ↩︎
225. Lenin, V., 1917b. The Impending Catastrophe and How to Combat It. Available at: https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1917/ichtci/index.htm ↩︎

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